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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. We will end a brutal regime...coalition forces 
will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security...we will help you build a 
peaceful and representative government...and Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent and 
sovereign nation...”  
 
- Address given by United States President George W. Bush to Freedom TV on April 10, 2003 
 
 On January 30th, 2005, Iraq held its first multi-party election since 1954, just four years 
before King Faisal II was executed in the military coup that spurred Saddam Hussein’s rise to 
absolutist power. The pre-election coordination effort was profound: the Independent Electoral 
Commission of Iraq (IECI) administered and monitored the elections in order to provide “a fair 
and transparent process;”1 the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and a coalition of 
NGOs advised the IECI and provided additional technical support; the Iraqi National Guard and 
a group of Iraqi military forces received supplementary security assistance from twenty-nine 
nations; and finally, the United States, Japan, and the European Union contributed more than 
$100 million combined to logistically support the implementation and organization of the 
January 30th electoral processes.2   
Despite the “insurgents’ threats to ‘wash the streets with blood,” over eight million Iraqis 
turned out to vote across nearly 6,000 voting centers in Iraq’s first democratic elections.3 
Roughly 19,000 candidates representing over 250 political entities vied for seats within the 
National Assembly, the provincial councils, and the Kurdistan National Assembly.4 Scores of 
                                               
1 “Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005.” U.S. Department of State Archives, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/41206.htm.   
2 “Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005.” U.S. Department of State Archives, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
3 Anderson, Liam, and Gareth Stansfield. “The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model.” Publius, vol. 35, 
no. 3, 2005. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4624718., p. 359 
4 “Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005.” U.S. Department of State Archives, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
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Iraqi citizens were photographed proudly holding up indelibly purpled fingers, symbolic of 
uncompromising voter participation despite the ubiquitous threat of violence. Among other 
leaders around the world, President George W. Bush championed the success of the elections. In 
a speech delivered the same day, he declared: 
“The Iraqi people themselves made this election a resounding success. Brave patriots 
stepped forth as candidates. Many citizens volunteered as poll-workers. More than 
100,000 Iraqi security force personnel guarded polling places and conducted operations 
against terrorist groups...Across Iraq today, men and women have taken rightful control 
of their country’s destiny, and they have chosen a future of freedom and peace.”5 
 
 President Bush’s declarations of “freedom and peace” were quickly extinguished by the 
emergence of a Sunni-dominated insurgency, sectarian violence, and terrorist organizations, all 
of which rose from the ashes of political turmoil. Although the Bush Administration heralded 
high voter turn-out and the relative lack of violence as decisive triumphs over the expanding 
insurgency, it failed to recognize the long-lasting implications of the electoral results themselves. 
Among other issues, a staggering 90-95% of Sunni Arab voters did not participate in the 
elections, resulting in the over-representation of groups like the Kurds in the Assembly.6 
Additionally, no seats were reserved for the religious minorities, further exacerbating existing 
ethnic and religious cleavages present in the country.7 Finally, in interviews conducted in the 
wake of the ostensibly successful elections, many Iraqis expressed indignation over the role of 
the United States; many did “not accept that fundamental choices about the shape of their future 
political system…[had been] named by a foreign power, particularly one they [regarded] as a 
harbinger of secular, materialistic values far removed from the Muslim world’s.”8 It was from 
                                               
5 “Transcript of Bush Address on Iraq Election.” CNN, Cable News Network, 30 Jan. 2005, 
www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/30/bush.transcript/.  
6 Anderson and Stansfield, “The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model,”  p. 365  
7 O’Sullivan, Meghan, and Razzaq al-Saiedi. “Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq's Three Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their 
Political Implications.” Belfer Center Discussion Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2014, p. 18 
8 Burns, John F. “The Vote, and Democracy Itself, Leave Anxious Iraqis Divided.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2005, 
www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/washington/world/the-iraqi-election-the-process-the-vote-and-democracy.html.  
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these seeds of discontent that the insurgency grew and terrorist organizations pervaded, taking 
advantage of gaping holes in Iraq’s first democratic processes.  
 The American-led war not only shattered all political and military institutions in Iraq, but 
also undermined existing bureaucratic mechanisms equipped to provide stability and security for 
the civilian population. Two primary factors led to the inception of both the insurgency and the 
Islamic State (ISIS): first, the Bush Administration disbanded Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-
dominated army in 2003, which resulted in roughly 230,000 unemployed, military-trained men 
inclined to oppose the Shi’a majority.9 Second, with the aid of Bashar al-Assad’s anti-American 
regime in Syria, foreign fighters and extremist groups gained easy access to Iraq, facilitating the 
flow of weapons and supplies.10 In 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was founded by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi and was categorized as “a splinter group,” bent on the creation of a new caliphate 
centered in the Middle East.11 Despite the devastation AQI endured between 2006 and 2010 at 
the hands of American-sponsored military campaigns, the mushrooming terrorist organization 
regained footholds by exploiting Iraq’s volatile political arena and the departure of American 
military forces in 2011.  
After the invasion and first elections, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
politically reconstructed the Iraqi state along Shi’a-dominated lines, further inflaming sectarian 
divides and disenfranchising the formerly-powerful Sunni population. He quietly endorsed 
violent Shia militia groups, effectively alienating moderate Sunnis and facilitating AQI’s 
recruitment operations.12 By 2006, sectarian violence had reached unprecedented levels, and the 
                                               
9 Yosufi, Abdul Basir. “The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict.” Connections, vol. 15, no. 4, 
2016. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26326461, p. 97 
10 Pfiffner, James P. US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army, Intelligence and National Security, 25:1, 2010. DOI: 
10.1080/02684521003588120, p. 79 
11 Martin, Michaela, and Hussein Solomon. “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding.” Contemporary Review of the 
Middle East, vol. 4, no. 1, 2017, doi:10.1177/2347798916681319., p. 18 
12 Yosufi, “The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict,” p. 99 
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death toll climbed to just under 35,000; terrorist attacks exceeded 5,000 in November alone, and 
many Sunnis joined AQI, then transforming into the ISIS, and other extremist groups for 
protection.13 
By 2010, a new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of ISIS and “started an 
aggressive campaign in 2010 to recruit former Ba’athists and army officers to revitalize the 
weakened insurgency,” thereby incorporating swaths of trained, embittered men into its front 
lines.14 To make matters worse, the United States formally withdrew from Iraq in December of 
2011, thus aggravating existing gaps in Iraq’s security vacuum and intensifying ISIS’s 
campaign.15 In June of 2014, ISIS captured international attention when it seized Mosul, the 
second largest city in Iraq, and subsequently forced all “Shi’a-dominated Iraqi forces out, 
holding the reins of the entire city.”16 On June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi announced the formation of 
an empire extending from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq, the genesis of what the group hoped 
would become a global caliphate.17 At the height of its crusade, the Islamic State controlled 
roughly 40% of Iraq’s territory via a “blitzkrieg campaign” of force, fear tactics, and extremist 
propaganda.18  
In March of 2019, Kurdish and Arab forces financially and militarily supported by the 
United States recaptured the last of ISIS’s strongholds.19 Six months later, al-Baghdadi 
committed suicide while trapped in a tunnel by U.S. special operations forces. Despite these 
setbacks, the group remains operational, and, alarmingly resurgent; Russell Travers, director of 
                                               
13 Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 270 
14 Yosufi, “The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict,” p. 97 
15 al-Hamid, Raed. “The American Withdrawal from Iraq: Ways and Means for Remaining Behind,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5:2, 230-251, 
2012, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.669094, p. 244 
16 Martin and Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding,”  p. 18 
17 “Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-
islamic-state.  
18 Coker, Margaret, and Falih Hassan. “ISIS Is Weakened, but Iraq Election Could Unravel Hard-Won Stability.” The New York Times, The New 
York Times, 30 Jan. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/middleeast/iraq-election-abadi.html.  
19 “The World Factbook: Iraq.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/print_iz.html.  
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the United States National Counterterrorism Center, contends that “over the last year, ISIS 
carried out a number of centrally coordinated transnational attacks and propaganda campaigns, 
indicating a degree ‘of enhanced connectivity.’ Even after Baghdadi’s death...the group ‘remains 
robust and—in some areas—is expanding.’”20 Furthermore, they have continued to capitalize on 
the security vacuum that still envelopes much of Iraq, enabling them to rebuild and concentrate 
in small, decentralized cells.  
Retrospectively, Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in removing Saddam Hussein from 
power. However, the repercussions were calamitous and continue to incapacitate bureaucratic, 
economic and political stability today. As demonstrated by the wars in countries like Iraq and 
Vietnam, American foreign policy pertaining to post-counterinsurgency democracy promotion 
and nation-building has largely failed, yielding protracted national security threats and 
compromising the safety of civilians around the world. However, one U.S. counterinsurgency 
mission in the 1980s and 1990s has been championed as a resounding success; politicians around 
the world laud the efficacy of El Salvador’s post-war rebuilding process, which incorporated 
former insurgents into the political arena, reconstructed the military and police forces, and 
brought human rights issues to the forefront of national reforms. These measures, along with 
other historical and cultural factors that facilitated stability, helped to ensure that El Salvador 
never regressed into total war.  
Why did the El Salvador case and the Iraq case culminate in radically different 
outcomes? More broadly, why has the United States faced increased difficulty in translating 
political objectives via military means into stability and success, and why did Iraq in particular 
regress into near anarchy despite the introduction of democratic processes? Interestingly, the 
                                               
20Almohammad, Asaad. “New Caliph, Same Old Problems.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 3 Jan. 2020, 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2020-01-01/new-caliph-same-old-problems.  
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destabilizing effects of democratization have long been documented in political science and 
conflict with American foreign policy.  
Research Question 
In U.S. counterinsurgency missions, what are the effects of democratic elections and 
electoral processes on security in the post bellum, or post-war era? Under what conditions do we 
see heightened security? How can we reconcile the disparities between U.S. policy assumptions 
regarding democracy promotion and social scientific findings about democratization, stability 
and violence? In particular, how does the best case scenario of El Salvador compare with the 
worst case scenario of Iraq, and why were the outcomes of these conflicts so drastically 
different? 
Structure of Thesis 
 In order to answer these questions, I will first compare U.S. foreign policy with literature 
exploring the correlation between democratization and violence. I will then dive deeper into the 
nature of insurgencies and Just War Theory in order to provide additional context surrounding 
the significance of security in the post-war era. Lastly, I will discuss my analytical methodology, 
case studies, and next steps. 
The second chapter will provide a brief history of the Salvadoran Civil War, the post-war 
rebuilding era, elections, and the state of security. I will then draw conclusions based off of my 
findings relevant to the competing theories explained above and offer my own analysis of 
security studies. The third chapter will provide a brief history of the Iraq War, the attempted 
post-war rebuilding era, elections, and state of security. I will then draw conclusions based off of 
my findings, trace the state of security over time, and draw relevant conclusions. The final 
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chapter will draw conclusions from my deep-dive analysis of each case and will culminate in my 
approach to rectifying the tensions between U.S. policy and political theory. 
U.S. Foreign Policy: Championing Democracy Promotion  
The democratic peace theory, or “the idea that democratic or liberal states never or very 
rarely go to war with each other,” can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s A Project of Perpetual 
Peace, published in 1795.21 Throughout the 21st century in particular, certain facets of the 
democratic peace theory have informed U.S. foreign policy, as policymakers credit democracy 
promotion with long-term stability and peace. Liberal theorists suggest that the absence of “war 
between democracies is attributable to their domestic institutional arrangements,” highlighting 
voter participation and accountability as a key deterrent in political decision-making when it 
comes to waging war.22 Normative theorists contend that democracies, which share ideals and 
values regarding war, typically reconcile differences and disputes via non-violent means.23 As 
Jack Levy indicated, the notion of democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical 
law in the study of international relations.”24 As an extension of the democratic peace theory, 
democracy promotion has served as a core axiom of U.S. foreign policy since the end of WWII. 
 On January 18, 1918, in an address to a joint session of Congress, President Woodrow 
Wilson proposed his acclaimed “Fourteen Points,” a compilation of recommendations aimed at 
preventing an iteration of World War I. His underlying message touted democracy promotion 
and the spread of political freedom as the basis for all peace. Years later, American policy-
makers continue to defend Wilson’s lofty vision:  
                                               
21 Gat, Azar. “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity.” World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/40060125., p. 73 
22 Elman, Colin. “Introduction: History, Theory, and the Democratic Peace.” The International History Review, vol. 23, no. 4, 2001. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/40108832., p. 760 
23 Russett, Bruce, et al. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton University Press, 1993. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rqf6., p. 38-40 
24 Levy, Jack S. “Domestic Politics and War,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb Cambridge, Mass., 
1989, p. 88  
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“Wilson’s words have echoed through the years, and have been often repeated or restated 
by American presidents. This has particularly been the case in times of crisis: after World 
War I, Wilson called for democracy in Europe; after World War II we called for 
democracy in Japan and Germany; during the Cold War we called for democracy in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; today, we call for democracy in the Middle East.”25 
 
Following World War II, democracy promotion rose even higher on foreign policy agendas. In 
1961, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) referenced “democratic participation” and “effective 
institutions of democratic governance” among the central tenets of U.S. foreign policy.26 Since 
the 1960s, American politicians have asserted that democratic efforts “are essential to global 
development and U.S. security because stable democracies tend to have better economic growth 
and stronger protection of human rights,”27 an idea that has fueled the allocation of more than $2 
billion annually over the past decade from foreign assistance funds toward democracy promotion 
activities, all managed by American political institutions.28  
The 1970s brought the establishment of a multitude of institutions pertaining to 
democracy and human rights promotion. In part bolstered by the Cold War, Congress amended 
the FAA in 1975 to “restrict aid to the governments of countries that engaged in a consistent 
pattern of ‘gross violations’ of human rights, as detailed in the legislation, and creating the 
position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at State in 1976.”29 
Democratization has been increasingly pivotal in U.S. foreign policy agendas and national 
security strategy since its founding, and especially since 1945.  
                                               
25 “Aid and Democracy Promotion in American Foreign Policy.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/aid-and-democracy-promotion-
american-foreign-policy. 
26 United States, Congress, “Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002.” Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, I-A and I-B, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 2003, p. 23 
27 United States, Congress, Lawson, Marian Leonardo, and Susan B. Epstein. “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance.” 
Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, 4 Jan. 2019. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/R44858, p. 1 
28 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 1 
29 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 4 
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The following overview will provide a brief summary of the ways in which democracy 
promotion permeated foreign policy from Carter to Bush. The Carter administration propounded 
democracy promotion rooted in human rights campaigns; the Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton 
administrations intensified the democracy promotion agenda via containment policies, 
particularly as the U.S. became threatened by communist regimes; and finally, the second Bush 
administration redirected democracy promotion as a preemptive national security strategy to 
prevent the recurrence of events like 9/11.  
The Carter Administration: Human Rights and Democracy Promotion 
Overtly cognizant of the immense failures of the Vietnam War, the Carter administration 
emphasized democracy promotion as part of its larger human rights campaign, seeking “reform 
within existing regimes, not the overthrow of totalitarians.”30 Carter attempted to reform what 
many perceived as an American imperialist agenda, or a “‘policy by manipulation’ rather than 
internationalism grounded in respect for personal liberties.”31 Subsequently, President Carter 
sought to “transcend the quasi-imperialistic hubris of the moralistic foreign policy that had 
ensnared the United States into the Vietnam War” by announcing his commitment to upholding 
man’s “most basic right,” which was to “be free of arbitrary violence, whether that violence 
come from governments, from terrorists, from criminals, or from self-appointed messiahs 
operating under the cover of politics or religion.32  
In doing so, Carter encountered issues of “uneven leverage, perceptions of national 
security interest, and specialized bureaucratic focus militated against consistency.”33 Many 
criticized the his administration for “definitional ambiguities, always tending to expose tensions 
                                               
30 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 4 
31 Bouchet, Nicolas, et al. US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama. Routledge, 2013., p. 123 
32 Bouchet, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, p. 121 
33 Bouchet, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, p. 128 
 Lawry 10 
between rights, interests, and the principle of state sovereignty.”34 Despite these setbacks, the 
Carter administration has left behind a legacy of institutionalized human rights practices hinged 
upon democratic freedoms and values.35  
The Reagan Administration: Anti-Communist Democracy Promotion 
In a shift in policy, the Reagan Administration distanced democracy promotion from 
Carter’s human rights campaign, instead reorienting it as a crucial building block within his 
broader anti-Communist scheme.36 Reagan operated under a structural lens of democracy, 
emphasizing “free and fair elections” as touchstones in the process of democratization; to this 
point, many assert that Reagan “solidified a bipartisan consensus within Congress and the 
American public that the United States had a strategic interest in promoting a transition to 
electoral democracy among its autocratic allies.”37 Accordingly, Reagan sought to propel 
forward “The Third Wave” of democracy through the establishment of institutions like the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its affiliated branches, which include the 
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for National Affairs, and the 
Free Trade Union Institute. Above all, he is largely credited with diminishing the power of the 
Soviet Union and championing the idea of American exceptionalism:   
“I’ve always believed that individuals should take priority over the state. History has 
taught me that that is what sets American apart—not to remake the world in our own 
image, but to inspire people wherever with a sense of their boundless possibilities.”38 
 
In order to “inspire people” and create favorable conditions for democratization, Reagan 
lobbied for the enlargement of international alliances and global partnerships, particularly 
                                               
34 Bouchet, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, p. 124 
35 Rosati, Jerel A. “Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy over the Carter 
Administration.” Political Psychology, vol. 9, no. 3, 1988, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3791726., p. 483 
36 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 5 
37 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 5 
38 Nau, Henry R. Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan. Princeton University Press, 
2015., p. 175 
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through the revitalization of NATO and the IMF. Furthermore, he actively applied government-
to-government policies foundationally intent on applying “persistent diplomatic pressure to 
support domestic dissidents and economic sanctions to weaken non-democratic governments.”39 
Lastly, Reagan supported military interventions to “subvert non-democratic governments, 
particularly by covert actions.”40 However, in comparison to George H.W. Bush, who led the 
first Gulf War, and his son, George W. Bush, who launched invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
many depict Reagan as “a dove.”41  
The George H.W. Bush Administration: Anti-Communist Democracy Promotion 
President George H.W. Bush intentionally maintained the democratic rhetoric and 
promotion policies of his predecessors, representative of the continuation of a long-term strategy 
meant to impair the spread of communism abroad.42 He is credited with supporting “successful 
transitions to democratic governance and free markets...and an end to communist expansion” 
during his term in office, often employing military and interventionist means to do so.43 In his 
1989 inaugural address, Bush promoted democracy and the exportation of democratic principles 
abroad: “Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on 
Earth: through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered 
by the state.”44  
The end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw immense changes to the communist coalition 
in Europe, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the slow but steady disintegration of the 
                                               
39 Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, p. 151 
40 Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, p. 151 
41 Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, p. 151 
42 Engel, Jeffrey A. “A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On.” Diplomatic 
History, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 25–46. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24916032., p. 29 
43 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 5 
44 Engel, “A Better World...But Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On,” p. 30 
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Soviet Bloc by means of peaceful revolutions. While Bush wholly supported these changes, his 
policy favored stability over immediate transformation:  
“Because he longed to extend the sphere of American-led democracy, bringing new areas 
under the American orbit of stability, Bush feared volatility most of all...For example, he 
argued in May of 1989 for peaceful East-West negotiations capable of producing a slow 
but steady strategic transformation and integration of the Soviet Bloc into the global 
system, rather than outright Communist collapse, hoping to ‘dramatically increase 
stability on the continent’ so as to ‘set out a new vision Europe...’”45 
 
Despite his prudence, “the end of the Cold War seemed for Bush and for those around him 
validation of American values and policies. American leaders believed democracy had won, 
actively vanquishing their long-term adversary. They had not merely survived and transcended 
communism. They had defeated it.”46 
 The Bush Administration prevailed a second time during the First Gulf War following 
Iraq’s unprecedented invasion of Kuwait; Operation Desert Storm, Bush’s military mission, 
began in January of 1991 when U.S.-led coalition forces initiated an air strike campaign against 
Iraq. Roughly one month later, the coalition commenced the ground war and swiftly 
overwhelmed Iraqi forces, proclaiming victory on February 28th. On March 6th, President Bush 
addressed a joint session of Congress and declared, “tonight Kuwait is free,” just two months 
after the war began.47  
 The First Gulf War had morale-boosting effects on policy-makers and the U.S. military; 
it demonstrated the viable feasibility of what Bush referred to as the “‘New World Order,’ 
breaking down Cold War alliances and using peaceful nations to stand united against rogue 
states.”48 Many realists argued that it would be difficult to justify American intervention in states 
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without a “clear national interest.”49 Bush, pushing back on this conviction, asserted that since 
the ending of the Cold War, the United States possessed a duty as the undisputed world leader to 
“guard against human rights abuses, defend democratic regimes, and lead humanitarian 
efforts.”50 Subsequently, the Bush Administration introduced the Freedom Support Act in 1992, 
which was “intended to help the people and governments of these newly independent states 
navigate the difficult transition from communism to democracy and market-based economies.”51 
Bush’s vision of a New World Order transcended his term and influenced the Clinton 
Administration deeply, emblematic of the unequivocal continuation of democracy promotion 
across generations and presidential terms. 
The Clinton Administration: Democratic Enlargement 
Like the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration designated 
democracy promotion as one of the foremost pillars of its’ foreign policy. In his 1994 State of the 
Union Address, Clinton asserted that “ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to 
build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't 
attack each other; they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”52 Generally, the 
1990s saw “tremendous growth in democracy promotion activities, which experts have attributed 
to a low threat perception, a global wave of democratic transitions that provided many windows 
of opportunity, and no strong ideological rival to Western liberal democracy.”53 His policy 
became known as “democratic enlargement,” the successor of containment and a scheme that 
arose from the post-Cold War world:  
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“Our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of 
market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to the 
survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under 
those free institutions.”54 
 
Clinton’s National Security Strategy (NSS) pronounced that “all of America’s strategic 
interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they 
threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market 
nations.”55 “Serving the community” meant siphoning billions of dollars into market reforms, the 
establishment of new institutions like the Agency for International Development (AID), and 
putting pressure on multilateral, international organizations to adopt democratic standards.56 
Liberal internationalists prevailed throughout Clinton’s second term, championing the 
capabilities of transnational organizations; for example, “they praised the multilateral strength of 
military organizations such as NATO, which came to represent the iron fist of protection for 
more pacific transnational projects such as improved human rights, enhanced global trade, or a 
United Nations finally free to fulfill its global mandate absent its Cold War restraints.”57 The 
Clinton administration’s foreign policy legacy is largely positive; increased democratic rhetoric 
and the sustained institutionalization of free market capitalism and human rights engrained 
democracy promotion into peace-time foreign policy.  
The George W. Bush Administration: The Freedom Agenda  
President George W. Bush’s democracy promotion agenda intensified sharply, 
particularly during the aftermath of the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in 2001: “In post-Cold War 
America, the foreign policy establishment had been adrift, with no obvious overriding threat akin 
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to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The September 11 attacks filled that void. The Bush 
administration's response became the dominant issue in U.S. foreign policy, overshadowing all 
other international issues.”58 Furthermore, the Bush administration asserted that “a lack of 
democracy in the Arab world created a breeding ground for terrorism, and that democracy 
promotion could help contain Islamist extremism as it once had sought to contain Marxist 
rebels.”59 In cases of democratizing nations, the Bush administration provided aid and funding, 
and in cases of autocratic nations, President Bush considered democracy promotion to be 
essential in preventing the recurrence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
As seen in the cases of former administrations, Bush’s “freedom agenda” was rooted in 
the democratic peace theory, a policy that Bush applied through military intervention and 
counter-terrorism missions. The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent installation of a pro-
American president were thought to contribute to a democratic “domino-effect” in which other 
countries would democratize as well in what Bush perceived to be an “incubator of 
extremism.”60 In a speech given on September 12th, 2002 at the United Nations, Bush stated: 
“The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic 
Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world.”61 
In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched a comprehensive vision of 
transformational diplomacy designed to elevate democracy-promotion activities and “to work 
with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states 
that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the 
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international system.”62 This transformational diplomacy diverged from anteceding policies in 
that it no longer “claimed to view foreign policy...as managing relations between states, but as 
helping to bring about changes within states through promoting democracy, with the goal of a 
‘balance of power that favors freedom.’”63 More specifically, the 2002 National Security 
Strategy redefined the balance of power as one that would prioritize “human freedom,” meaning 
individual liberties that transcend the authority of the domestic political system.64 Accordingly, 
the Bush administration (1) increased spending exponentially; (2) created new bureaucratic 
institutions designed to oversee security and promote democracy, including the establishment of 
the Department of Homeland Security and the office of the Director of National Intelligence; and 
(3) deployed military forces in nations around the world, focusing primarily on accumulating 
U.S. military presence in the Middle East and North Africa.65  
Since the end of President Bush’s term in office, many have argued that his “freedom 
agenda” was undermined “…by the association of democracy promotion with military 
intervention, the use of counterterrorism measures that ‘undercut the symbolism of freedom,’ and 
free elections in the Middle East in which Islamist parties made gains, in conflict with U.S. 
interests.’”66 As exemplified in the first few pages of this chapter, many of Bush’s foreign 
policies failed significantly, the direct cost being threats to national and domestic security. While 
many blame the failures of recent American counterinsurgency efforts on the factors listed 
above, proponents of the violence and democratization theory offer supplementary evidence to 
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exhibit the often adverse effects of democratization on security, stability and peace in 
transitioning states.  
Literature Review: Political Science on Democratization and Violence  
As illustrated above, the majority of American presidents and their administrations 
throughout the past half-century have touted the validity of democracy promotion in peace-
building endeavors: “Since the time of Woodrow Wilson, idealists in the United States have 
envisioned a global transformation in which peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing.”67 
Politicians have frequently cited the fact that “no mature democracies have ever fought a war 
against each other. Consequently, conventional wisdom holds that promoting the spread of 
democracy will promote world peace and security.”68  
Contrary to these beliefs, many political scientists have argued that instead of bringing 
peace and security, the process of democratization actually increases the probability of violence, 
particularly in states lacking a history of democratic practices and those with pre-existing ethnic, 
religious, and sectarian cleavages. While they acknowledge that “...over the long run, it is 
probably true that the further spread of democracy will promote global peace and stability...the 
beginning stages of transitions to democracy often give rise to war rather than peace...in the short 
run.”69 It is important to note that most U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion missions 
throughout the past half-century have involved underdeveloped nations lacking any history of 
democratic norms and institutions, such as El Salvador and Iraq. It appears that when it comes to 
immature democracies, policy-makers have assumed the efficacy of Euro-centric state-building 
frameworks and procedures only applicable to mature democracies.  
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In Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Edward Mansfield and 
Jack Snyder underscore the ever-growing chasm between the behaviors of stable, established 
democracies and immature, incomplete democracies and the ways in which the latter have 
become increasingly prone to violence. In reconciling notions of the democratic peace theory 
with the disquieting instability of democratizing states, they clarify: “War has never happened 
between mature democracies, yet countries undertaking a transition toward democracy are quite 
war-prone towards regimes of all types.”70 In examining the transition from autocracy to 
democracy, Mansfield and Snyder emphasize the particularly volatile nature of mixed states: 
“Often, the demise of autocracy precipitates an incomplete democratic transition to a mixed 
regime that combines some features of autocracy and some of democracy in a distinctly 
explosive political cocktail.”71 Both theorists propose that the driving factor behind this 
susceptibility to violence is the existence of weak, vulnerable institutions, and a supporting 
(although not causal) factor is a lack of internalized liberal norms.  
First and foremost, Electing to Fight argues that vulnerable, transitioning democracies 
possess “serious institutional deficits” which undermine the legitimacy and stability of the state, 
empower power-hungry elites, intensify domestic political competition and produce easily-
exploitable security voids.72 In contrast, effective and developed institutions “make the 
government accountable, through regular elections, to the average voter who bears the costs of 
risks of war.”73 In order to avoid an outbreak of violence, Mansfield and Snyder’s “most general 
rule is to start the process by building the institutions that democracy requires, and then 
encouraging mass political participation and unfettered electoral competition only after these 
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institutions have begun to take root.”74  Consequently, Snyder and Mansfield refer to the “poorly 
defined sense of ‘the nation,’” created by the absence of strong state institutions that typically 
“knit together the nation,” as one of the most detrimental side effects of state weakness, as it 
exacerbates the security vacuum and encourages civilians to create their own definitions, often 
rooted in violence and division.75  
 Secondly, Mansfield and Snyder shed light on the importance of internalized liberal 
norms in democratizing states; they reference another scholar, Fareed Zakaria, who states that 
“‘illiberal democracies’ hold elections of dubious fairness, lack a strong commitment to liberal 
civic norms, and tend to become embroiled in military conflicts.”76 The lack of democratic 
accountability present enhances the capacity for corruption and misconduct in elections and 
democratic practices, each of which triggers destabilizing reverberations and the creation of 
opposition groups empowered to utilize violence. 
 In “The ‘Happy Outcomes’ May Not Come at All—Post War Violence in Central 
America,” Sabine Kurtenbach echoes many of Mansfield and Snyder’s arguments, although she 
supplements their claims with a more nuanced argument: generally, she acknowledges that lower 
levels of violence impact state security just as much as war. According to Kurtenbach: 
“The non-recurrence of war is mostly considered as the main indicator for successful 
peace processes. Nevertheless, even in these post-war contexts, other forms of violence—
i.e. state repression or homicide—have the potential to endanger the larger process of 
peace-building. Hence, the analysis of variations in post-war violence is important for the 
broader peace processes.”77 
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Lesser forms of violence are largely ignored when examining the post-war state of security: 
“There is a general tendency to treat war and other forms of violence, e.g., repression or crime, 
as mutually independent. While the debate on ‘new wars’...acknowledges the blurred line 
between political and criminal manifestations of violence, the debate on post-war violence is still 
dominated by this rather dichotomous distinction.”78 In her paper titled “State-Building, War and 
Violence: Evidence from Latin America,” Kurtenbach goes further to assert that state-building 
can be influenced by broader elements as well: “State-building is a long and complex process 
influenced by historical developments and shaped by other factors related to violence, too: for 
example, the intensity of destruction or the legitimization of the use of force.”79 She references 
Charles Tilly, who argues that state agents execute four primary activities: (1) war-making, or 
eliminating rivals outside state borders; (2) state-making, or neutralizing rivals inside state 
borders; (3) protection, or eliminating enemies that threaten civilians; and (4) extraction, or 
acquiring the means to execute the first three activities.80 While Kurtenbach observes the 
entrenchment of these activities in European cases, she also argues that the “replication of these 
processes in the developing countries of the second half of the twentieth century is difficult and 
unlikely...most developing countries ‘lack comparable forms of social cohesion at the national 
level,’” often leading to revitalized forms of violence.81 
Further, Kurtenbach asserts that other “risk factors” of violence materialize in 
susceptible, vulnerable transitional settings, many of which don’t lead to full war but encourage 
spikes of unrest, crime, and insurgent activity. As demonstrated by the enduring doctrine of 
democracy promotion in the foreign policies of U.S. presidents, “the end of war is mostly 
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perceived as a window of opportunity for the pursuit of violence control and the reduction of 
insecurity.”82 However, Kurtenbach understands that the “transition out of war produces 
insecurity in the first place,” thereby jeopardizing the stability of emergent democracies in 
interim stages.83 Overall, Kurtenbach propounds the idea that “the patterns of war and violence 
termination are decisive for state-building across different forms of violence. The outcome can 
be conceptualized as a critical juncture as it shapes specific power relations, policy options, and 
time horizons for state-building.”84 
 In From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-Building, Anna Jarstad and Timothy 
Sisk contend that successful transitions to democracy require “a minimum level of security and 
consensus on which territory and people constitutes the state.”85 In correspondence with 
arguments made above, Jarstad and Sisk assert that, despite the ostensible finality and legitimacy 
of peace negotiations and deals, “the legacies of war tend to linger. Insecurity and unsolved 
grievances mean that political elites, as well as civil society, remain polarized and that the basis 
for inclusive ideologies is weak.”86 The decimation of both the economy and invaluable 
infrastructure during the war further aggravates these legacies, leading to general societal 
degeneration and again, a lack of security.87 
Many scholars concur with the arguments made above. In The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Michael Mann argues that “regimes newly embarked upon 
democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than are stable 
authoritarian regimes,” further illuminating deficiencies in the security sector and judicial branch 
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in the post-war rebuilding era.88 Similarly, Geoffrey Pridham affirms that “the weakening of 
state authority, combined with uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity 
that comes with democratization. This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups 
who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, weak state 
authority, and rising nationalism.”89  
Other scholars have shed light on the fact that “The Fourth Wave” of democratization has 
encompassed “...more challenging cases: countries that are poorer, more ethnically divided, 
ideologically more resistant to democracy, with more entrenched authoritarian elites, and which 
a much frailer base of governmental institutions and citizen-skills.”90 Mousseau’s article, titled 
“Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?” succinctly captures the highly 
representative inverted U-shape impact of democracy, which underscores the conditions under 
which political violence manifests: 
 
Figure 1: The correlation between levels of violence and type of government, conceptually created from the U-Shaped scale 
referenced in Mousseau’s “Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?”91 
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The evidence outlined above lends credence to the reality that transitional, unstable democracies 
with weak institutions, existing cleavages, and transient liberal norms are likely to encounter 
heightened levels of violence, if not a regression into total war. The tension between the findings 
of political scientists mentioned above and U.S. foreign policy has become progressively more 
perceptible over the past few decades.  
Since Vietnam, the United States has faced increased difficulty in translating political 
objectives via military means into stability and success. The colossal disparities between the 
United States’ national strategic goals, particularly those pertaining to counterinsurgency 
missions, and their end results are demonstrative of the necessity to review post-war peace-
building procedures. As both American policy-makers and political theorists tout security as a 
crucial building block in reference to both transitioning domestic states and the national security 
of the United States, we should continue to examine the ways in which the post-war security 
increases or decreases, and why. 
Jus Post Bellum 
 In order to understand the significance of security and justice within the context of post-
war rebuilding efforts, it is vital to examine the rising importance of Just War Theory, which is 
defined as a doctrine of military ethics, detailing the conditions under which it is morally 
acceptable to go to war, conduct war, and restore peace after war.92 The theory can be divided 
into three distinct elements: jus ad bellum, or the “pre-engagement conduct of states and non-
state actors that are considering whether to engage in war and armed conflict...concerned with 
the justification of and limits to the use of force;”93 jus in bello, or the “body of legal norms 
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governing battle and occupation—the ‘conduct of individuals and units toward combatants, non-
combatants, property, and the environment;”94 and finally, jus post bellum, or “the moral rules 
that should guide [the ways in which] wars are ended, specifically the political, social, and 
economic conditions left in the wake of the war.”95  
The origins of Just War Theory can be traced back Christian theologian St. Augustine of 
Hippo, who asserted that “war, though terrible, could be necessary in the face of certain dangers 
and lawful if conducted properly in the pursuit of peace.”96 Thomas Aquinas, utilizing St. 
Augustine’s framework, later developed the founding conditions under which wars could be 
regarded as morally “just,” many of which have become embedded into modern international law 
and theory, such as the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions.97  
Since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, extensive scholarship has been published on 
the legal and strategic ramifications of adhering to jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the latter of 
which has become increasingly important in counterinsurgency missions. Both jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello possess a broadly accepted set of distinct principles that allow states to uphold each 
indubitably: “Contemporary rules of armed force do not contain only prohibitions for states and 
armed forces; they channel armed violence and regulate the relations between different actors 
(military forces, civilians, ousted government) in situations of armed conflict. However, the 
classical concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello contain gaps with respect to the management 
of post-conflict relations.”98   
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In accordance with this statement, I argue that the third and often overlooked component 
of Just War Theory, jus post bellum, is critical to the long term political and military success of 
the United States in military interventions for three reasons: (1) the battle for the hearts and 
minds of host nation civilians extends beyond the end of occupation and war; (2) the successful 
restoration of peace via stabilizing institutions and norms dampens the threat of reinvigorated 
insurgent forces, limiting insurgent capacity to convalesce; and (3) the successful 
implementation of jus post bellum strengthens integral alliances and American strategic 
positioning in contentious regions, thereby reinforcing U.S. national security.99 Subsequently, 
understanding the strategic importance of jus post bellum’s role in the tripartite theory through 
the lens of counterinsurgency missions is crucial to constructing security and therefore 
maintaining the victories that have been hard fought and won.  
Although crucial, jus post bellum is a difficult venture for several reasons: first, the task 
of rebuilding and restoring peace to a nation is not only economically costly, but also produces 
few tangible benefits. Additionally, the methodology behind restoring justice after war is 
equivocal and morality is difficult to incentivize: “...most states do not want to take on 
the...responsibility [of restoring order after war], and when they do take it on, for whatever 
political reasons, they do not want to submit themselves to a set of moral rules.”100 Given the 
difficulties surrounding the stabilization of foreign regimes following military intervention, it is 
vital to examine jus post bellum and the ways in which the U.S has attempted to restore justice 
post-war. As the U.S. has become embroiled in more and more counterinsurgency missions and 
less and less conventional wars, it is next crucial to understand the nature of these insurgencies.  
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Fourth Generation Warfare: It’s Political 
Most American counterinsurgency missions have been fought against insurgents 
employing tactics of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), the premise of which is foundationally 
constructed upon Mao Tse-Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare. According to Mao, 4GW “uses all 
available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political 
decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for perceived 
benefit.”101 4GW is characterized by adaptability and agility as dynamic forces of combat; 
simple and dependable weaponry designed to impair the enemy; the decentralization of 
command and control; and lastly, superior intelligence gathering, reliant on a network of military 
and civilian agents.102 Many argue that successful execution of waging 4GW depends on 
winning the hearts and minds of local civilians, while others assert that brute force and coercion 
are the keys to success in counterinsurgency operations.  
For the purposes of this paper, I am assuming that the basic premises of population-
centric warfare are correct, as proponents of this model claim that winning the hearts and minds 
of the local population is crucial to success, particularly because reconstructing legitimacy and 
maintaining security in the post-war era depends on their support. According to Lieutenant 
General William B. Caldwell IV, “the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating 
among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different 
terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the 
final arbiters of success.”103 However, it is important to acknowledge that not all scholars in 
counterinsurgency agree on the soundness of population-focused approaches. As an example, 
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renowned military historian Gian Gentile claims that population-centric counterinsurgency 
should be a tactic and not a strategy in and of itself, as it has limited American military mindsets 
and distracted from targeting the insurgents themselves: “The new American way of war has 
eclipsed the execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building 
and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan.”104  
The hearts and minds theory delineates the potential strategic importance of adhering to 
moral and ethical standards in and after conflict in order to win over civilians and gain their 
support for the counterinsurgent cause. The war in Vietnam is often cited as the most salient 
example of what can happen if ethical principles are neglected and the civilian population aligns 
with the insurgency, thus highlighting this necessity and laying the foundation for revamping 
American political and military posture in counterinsurgency missions going forward  
As insurgents typically operate in smaller, decentralized cells and aim to acquire political 
legitimacy in order to win over the civilian population, establishing security via the coercive 
apparatus and entrenching norms pertaining to justice must take priority in the post-war era. In 
providing these necessary services via institutions, insurgents lack the political leverage and 
coercive strength to defeat counterinsurgents. Additionally, providing both security and justice 
discourages civilians from joining the insurgent cause, thereby delegitimizing it. The backbone 
of democracy rests on the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  
Analytical Methodology and Variables 
 In sum, the discrepancies between American foreign policy and the widely-accepted 
democratization literature (particularly salient through the lens of post-war counterinsurgency 
efforts) have produced critical questions regarding the role of electoral processes in post-war 
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reconstruction efforts. To answer them, I will process-trace the post-war state of security as the 
dependent variable in my two case studies, El Salvador and Iraq, which possessed different 
electoral processes, varying levels of security, and radically distinct outcomes.105 The 
independent variables are post-war democratic electoral processes, which encompasses factors 
ranging from political party inclusion to third-party monitoring programs.  
In the El Salvador chapter, I will provide an overview of the Salvadoran Civil War, 
American military and political strategy, and the post-war peace process. Next, I will examine 
the state of security over the course of the post-war period, monitoring for fluctuations and 
delving into the factors that either increased or decreased security. In the Iraq Chapter, I will 
provide an overview of the American invasion in 2003, American military and political strategy, 
and the post-war peace process. Next, I will dive deeper into the elements contributing to the 
regression of Iraq into a state of anarchy and the sectarian violence that undermined strides made 
toward democracy. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the elements that have 
contributed to heightened vs. decreased security, I will be tracing and comparing the fluctuations 
of security in both cases with each other. 
Case Studies: Iraq and El Salvador 
 In both Iraq and El Salvador, the United States’ primary objectives were to promote 
democracy, extinguish insurgent power, provide support for local allies, and equip host nations 
with the tools to create stability and peace within each respective regime.106 In each case, the 
United States faced a tumultuous political terrain, significant levels of internal turbulence 
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relating to ethno-religious and socio-economic cleavages, a plummeting GDP per capita, and a 
lack of stable bureaucratic institutions.  
Neither country possessed a history of democracy or democratic procedures: El Salvador 
operated under a republican political system controlled by an oligarchical order of the 
landowning elite and influenced by external actors, which later transformed into a military-led 
dictatorship in the mid-20th century.107 Similarly, Iraq’s political history includes Britain’s 
mandate, a Sunni-led monarchy, and the Ba’athist dictatorship led by totalitarian leader Saddam 
Hussein.108  
Each state also possessed high levels of internal strife: conflict along the many lines of 
cleavage in Iraqi society has been dominated by rural vs. urban, Sunni vs. Shi’a, and Kurd vs. 
Arab friction.109 El Salvador’s long-standing elite oligarchical social strata has also played a key 
role in exacerbating socio-economic and racial conflict. Furthermore, both states experienced 
levels of terrorism, which played a large role in destabilizing each state’s security institutions, 
delegitimizing emergent governments, and adding another layer to the multi-faceted arena of 
conflict during the war.  
Despite these similarities, politicians around the world have exalted the post-war peace 
process in El Salvador, broadcasting it as a resounding success. In fact, when the war in Iraq 
erupted, military personnel and policy-makers proposed exporting the El Salvador case as the 
model by which to follow in the Middle East.110 Conversely, the Iraq case is now considered one 
of the worst foreign policy disasters since the war in Vietnam. Although I will compare each 
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case to itself in order to examine the changing nature of security over time, I will also attempt to 
understand why the outcomes of each case differed so drastically in my fourth and final chapter.  
Next Steps 
The relative success in El Salvador and the failure in Iraq both shed light on the fact that 
“there can be no development without security, but there can be no security without development 
either.”111 How, then, can we understand rebuilding security and justice in post-war eras, and 
how should this reconstruction interact with electoral processes? I contend that providing 
security for the populace must take precedence, followed by the erection of judicial institutions 
that enforce rules and hold law-breakers accountable, particularly in counterinsurgency efforts. 
In the next chapter, I will examine El Salvador’s post-war case as I trace the state of security and 












                                               
111 Jabareen, Yosef. “Conceptualizing ‘Post-Conflict Reconstruction’ and ‘Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction’ of Failed States.” Int J Polit Cult 
Soc 26, 107–125, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-012-9118-3., p. 114 
 Lawry 31 
Chapter II: The Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1992) 
 In this chapter, I analyze the complexities pertaining to security and justice in the post-
war rebuilding process, and the ways in which these intricacies changed over time and 
contributed to the notion of political and military success in the El Salvador case. In answering 
my research question, democratic elections had largely favorable effects on the state of security, 
primarily because stipulations in the Peace Accords incorporated former insurgents and 
combatants into the political process. However, additional factors contributed to increased 
security in the post-war era, thereby obscuring any causal link between electoral processes and 
heightened security.  
Overall, I argue that the post-war peace process was mostly effective for four primary 
reasons: (1) the inclusion of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the 
political arena as a registered political party legitimized, validated and addressed the grievances 
of the marginalized peasant population; (2) the disarmament and disbandment of insurgent and 
state military forces and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life aided in maintaining the 
ceasefire; (3) the induction of civilian leaders into the military and police forces constrained their 
force-using capabilities; and (4) the involvement of international, third party actors increased the 
sense of accountability and guaranteed aid in the implementation of the Peace Accords. These 
successes, coupled with the fact that El Salvador never regressed into total war following the 
peace process, have been championed by democratic harbingers around the world.  
Along with these successes, it is important to acknowledge the shortcomings of post-war 
reforms, particularly as the broad-based notion of “success” in El Salvador has largely 
overshadowed more recent setbacks that threaten the security and stability of the country today. 
Most notably, a rise in organized, unanswered crime and gang violence throughout recent 
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decades sheds light on a few crucial deficiencies, most of which pertain to gaps in the Peace 
Accords with regard to judicial reforms. The following sections will delve into the roots of the 
civil war, cleavages along socio-economic lines, the involvement of the United States and its 
support of the existing government, and the successes and limits to post-war reforms.  
Key Terminology 
   Democracy Promotion: activities by external actors that seek to support 
democratization; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic 
institutions that play according to democratic rules. 
   Nation-Building: the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict or war designed to 
underpin fundamental societal transformation, which includes comprehensive efforts targeted at 
engineering major social, political, and economic reconstruction. 
   La Matanza: meaning “the slaughter” in Spanish.  
   Security Gap: the absence of coercive authority and resources available to provide security, 
often in post-war or conflict settings. 
 
A Historical Overview: The Roots of the Civil War  
The Salvadoran Civil War can be traced back to the Spanish conquest of the 16th century, 
in which conquistadores implemented a land-division system hierarchically characterized by 
class and race. Independence changed little in the country; the Spanish transferred power to 
Salvadorans of European ancestry, while indigenous people and mestizos, who comprised 95 
percent of the population, were reduced to “virtual serfdom.”112 Elite landowners in the country, 
also known as the Fourteen Families, reigned through a series of onerous military dictatorships 
that favored the wealthy and victimized the peasant population. The civil war in El Salvador, 
which spanned almost thirteen years from 1979 to 2012, was rooted in racial and socio-economic 
cleavages that continue to persist today.  
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Over the course of the 20th century, economic inequality became more perceptible; the 
top five percent of the population earned almost 40 percent of total income until the late 1970s, 
and less than two percent owned over 50 percent of the workable farmland.113 While the upper 
echelons of El Salvador’s socioeconomic strata possessed the majority of the wealth earned from 
exporting coffee and cotton, rural workers have long suffered greatly:  
“Malnutrition is endemic in El Salvador, and the infant mortality rate is twice that of 
Cuba, four times that of the United States. Functional illiteracy among the peasants 
approaches 95 percent. And some 60 percent of El Salvador's population is rural, living 
in isolated valleys or mountain hamlets.114  
 
New York Times writer Raymond Bonner noted that poverty levels in El Salvador were 
comparable to those in Mexico and India, although the latter two nations possessed significantly 
lower levels of class strife. He asks, “Why in El Salvador?” According to his findings, “part of 
the answer can be found in the nation’s failure to evolve even a flawed democratic process. That 
path to change has always been blocked - by the army.”115 
The Rise of Rural Insurgents 
In 1932, labor leader Agustin Farabundo Martí spearheaded a peasant revolt against the 
ruling dictatorship and the Fourteen Families with the objective of earning minimum wage and 
employment benefits. The military swiftly extinguished the uprising, killing an estimated 30,000 
civilians in what is now remembered as the la matanza. Since the uprising, El Salvador has been 
“the fiefdom of an oligarchy consisting of wealthy landowners and the army, with a military 
leader in the presidency.”116 Anger and dissatisfaction with the elitist government spurred the 
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rise of a left-wing coalition, an alliance that united farmers, intellectuals, and rural peasants 
against the right-wing government and aristocracy. 
The deep-rooted conflict between the left and the right accelerated following military 
crackdowns against the peasant population; throughout the 1960s and 1970s, left-wing guerrillas 
and right-wing paramilitary death squads resorted to political violence and indiscriminate 
killings against each other.117 In reference to the state of security in post-war counterinsurgency 
missions, it is important to note that the Salvadoran government possessed near monopoly over 
the use of force before the war began: “The Salvadoran security apparatus prevented the 
emergence of another massive uprising for several decades by instilling a climate of fear across 
the country...In the countryside, state terror targeted the ‘local grassroots opinion leaders’ who 
mobilized, organized, and provided political education to the majority of the population.”118 The 
state was able to maintain control over these local grassroots guerrillas until the late 1970’s.  
In 1977, armed leftist groups merged following an election favoring a moderate coalition 
which was subsequently blocked by the army, thus resulting in a “campaign of ‘destabilization’ 
that included strikes, street protests, and kidnappings.”119 Over the course of the next two years, 
political violence between the right and left escalated, resulting in an economic crisis and the 
deaths of thousands of unarmed civilians. In 1979, a coalition of young officers in the El 
Salvador Army banded together in an unsuccessful effort to persuade right-wing military dictator 
Carlos Humberto Romero to resign. Inspired by the Sandinista’s guerrilla victory in Nicaragua, 
which engendered waves of social change, these officers successfully organized a coup.120 
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Finally, on October 15th, 1979, moderate officers deposed Romero and assembled the 
Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG). The junta was headed by José Napoleón Duarte, the 
founder of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the winner of the 1972 presidential 
election, which was voided by the military. The new faction quickly faced instability and a new 
wave of violence:  
“The resulting junta, composed of three liberal civilians and two colonels, fell apart less 
than three months later; the civilians resigned after failing to oust the conservative 
Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia as Minister of Defense. Three other civilians were named 
in their stead, but one of them quit 10 weeks later to protest the accelerating political 
repression.”121  
 
As the JRG navigated the tumultuous political terrain, the guerrilla movement proliferated 
significantly: “A Communist leader had resigned from the party to form the Popular Forces of 
Liberation; the People’s Revolutionary Army was attracting disillusioned young Catholics. The 
roots of the movement were primarily among peasants and workers, with student support.”122 In 
response to the growing guerrilla presence, right-wing forces began employing a variety of 
violent tactics, including bombings, kidnappings and murder against the new government.123 
According to reports, the U.S. State Department simultaneously received warnings that the right-
wing death squads had formed an alliance with the military against the JRG.124 On March 24, 
1980, a military intelligence officer aligned with the right-wing paramilitary groups shot and 
killed Archbishop Romero, perhaps the most prominent and outspoken voice against the wave of 
violence that had engulfed the state.125 His assassination transformed the intermittent violence 
                                               
121 Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador.” The New York Times. 
122 Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador.” The New York Times. 
123 Ensalaco, Mark. “Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4, 1994, 
pp. 656–675. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/762563., p. 672 
124 “Annual Report on El Salvador.” The Center for Justice and Accountability, cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/. 
125 Gibb, Tom. “The Killing of Archbishop Oscar Romero Was One of the Most Notorious Crimes of the Cold War. Was the CIA to Blame?” The 
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 23 Mar. 2000, www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2000/mar/23/features11.g21. 
 Lawry 36 
between the right- and left-wings into a full-fledged civil war.126 When reflecting upon the roots 
of the civil war, Duarte proposed the following:  
“‘This is a history of people starving to death, living in misery. For 50 years, the same 
people had all the power, all the money, all the opportunities. Those who did not have 
anything tried to take it away from those who had everything. But there were no 
democratic systems available to them, so they have radicalized themselves, have resorted 
to violence. And of course this second group, the rich, do not want to give up anything, 
so they are fighting.’”127 
 
The Civil War  
 
In September of 1980, major leftist groups unified in an effort to consolidate power, 
resulting in the establishment of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its 
respective guerrilla army. In response to the consolidation of guerrilla power, army and security 
forces began “surrounding villages and slaughtering any villagers they suspected of being 
guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers.”128 In December, four American missionaries were raped 
and murdered by military and paramilitary forces, prompting President Jimmy Carter to order the 
temporary severance of military aid and the imposition of economic sanctions against the 
government.129 The Carter Administration additionally demanded a restructuring of the 
government in order to “guarantee enough civilian control of the armed forces to reduce the 
violence.”130 At this point, “the junta itself declared that these murders were the acts of groups in 
the security forces that were not under its control. This statement was a clear confession of 
weakness by the junta. The left realized that neither they, nor the right, nor the armed forces were 
taking the junta seriously.”131  
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The ensuing chaos prompted a reversal in U.S. policy, and the Carter Administration 
lifted sanctions two weeks later.  Carter’s policy  
“…attempted a rather delicate balancing act: providing military and security aid and 
training to a repressive force while improving its professionalization...U.S. strategists had 
to marginalize the extremist elements responsible for human rights abuses. Washington’s 
policy was predicated on the presumption that generous aid would provide the United 
States leverage over the Salvadoran military.”132  
 
Shortly thereafter, the Reagan Administration’s induction into the White House represented a 
stark turning point in U.S. policy and involvement in the civil war: “Asserting a hemispheric-
wide national security strategy, the Reagan administration considered the Salvadoran 
government–its atrocities notwithstanding–a friend in the Cold War.”133 Carter’s focus on 
curbing the capabilities of the Salvadoran military in order to reduce human rights violations was 
not reciprocated by Reagan; in fact, his administration turned a blind eye to the multitude of 
atrocities that were committed over the subsequent twelve years. His security strategy was 
focused primarily on containing communism, and included the establishment of an alliance 
between the military, members of the PDC, and the United States in order to combat the 
“deepening insurgent threat.”134 Over the course of the civil war, Reagan siphoned 
approximately five billion dollars of aid into the hands of the Salvadoran government and 
security forces.135 
 On January 10th, 1981, the FMLN commenced what was known as “the final offensive” 
against the existing government, prompting full-fledged American involvement in the conflict. 
The FMLN’s military factions were known as the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL) and the 
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Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), both of which orchestrated the attacks and 
coordinated long-term guerrilla strategies: “Anti-government violence erupted in the form of 
occupations of radio stations, bombings of newspapers (La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de 
Hoy), abductions, executions and attacks on military targets.”136 The FMLN also employed 
economic sabotage as a tactic to undermine the stability of the government.  
The Reagan administration organized a campaign of military aid and sent advisors to the 
government in an effort to keep them afloat. The majority of this aid “went to the formation of 
the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalions, the same groups identified by the UN Truth 
Commission as ‘the primary agents of war crimes.’”137 The Salvadoran government’s 
counterinsurgency operations supported by the U.S. utilized indiscriminate violence, death 
squads, and mass displacement as fear tactics against the civilian population. Several 
documented massacres against unarmed peasants resulted in charges of atrocious human rights 
abuses. As a result, state-sanctioned indiscriminate violence “fueled the guerrilla insurgency, 
whose capacity grew to rival that of the military.”138 After the attempted final offensive 
collapsed a few months later, “the guerrilla organizations consolidated their forces in the 
countryside. For the first few years of the war, the FMLN maintained a significant presence in 
widespread areas and developed a rural intelligence capacity that radically outperformed that of 
the government.”139 Despite being outnumbered one to four by government and paramilitary 
forces, the FMLN was able to maintain control over the countryside for the majority of the civil 
war.140 
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Elections held in 1982 resulted in the formation of a constituent assembly, a provisional 
government and the outline of a new constitution, which was disseminated in 1983.141  The 
FMLN pressured peasants into abstaining from voting in the elections, and the general command 
sent a letter to President Reagan expressing disdain at the soaring level of corruption and 
repression present in electoral processes:  
“To pretend that the solution to the Salvadoran conflict is the March elections is...outside 
reality. How can a democratic process be guaranteed in the context of indiscriminate 
repression? If you can decide the destiny of the United States, it is because you hold your 
office by virtue of free elections.”142 
 
Duarte was elected the first civilian president the following March in the country’s first 
democratic election in several decades, which was monitored by third party observers.143 In the 
fall of 1984, he met with guerrilla leaders in an effort to negotiate the end of the civil war, which 
proved unsuccessful.  
Despite his best efforts, Duarte faced massive setbacks and challenges during his term in 
office. He made little headway in his attempts to promote and install social and economic 
reforms, and seemed unable to curb the flow of indiscriminate violence from government and 
paramilitary forces. In 1989, Duarte was succeeded by Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) candidate Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, under whom the civil war ultimately concluded 
as both sides reached a stalemate. The ten years of civil strife wearied both sides, and over time, 
the government began to realize that “ongoing insurgent political mobilization and the FMLN’s 
military capacity gradually constituted the FMLN leadership as an insurgent counter-elite: the 
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war and its ongoing political crisis could not be resolved without their participation at the 
negotiating table.”144 
 On September 15, 1989, the government and the FMLN initiated peace negotiations, and 
signed the Geneva Agreement mediated by the United Nations six months later. Four months 
after that, government and FMLN representatives signed the Agreement on Human Rights, 
which licensed the United Nations to monitor human rights conditions through the United 
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).145 In January of 1992, the United Nations 
Security Council erected the ONUSAL-Military Division and the ONUSAL-Civilian Police 
Division to oversee the disarmament process and provide resources to facilitate the creation of a 
national police force.146 Government and FMLN representatives officially signed the peace 
agreement in Mexico City on January 16, 1992.  
Over the course of the civil war, over 70,000 individuals were killed via summary 
executions, landmine explosions, indiscriminate bombings and torture; over 500,000 individuals 
were internally displaced; and roughly 1 million individuals escaped the country as refugees.147 
The conflict produced systematic human rights violations, disappearances, bombings, mutilation, 
extrajudicial murder and mass rape, particularly at the hands of government-sanctioned security 
and military forces.148 In the post-war era, the World Bank contributed to the rebuilding process 
through reconstruction assistance from 1991 to 2002. Third party observers continued to monitor 
electoral processes in the country for years thereafter. Under the Mexico Peace Agreements, 
United Nations officials sponsored the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador titled “From 
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Madness to Hope,” an eight month mission to investigate the acts and effects of violence over 
the course of the civil war and to recommend a national reconciliation process.149 According to 
the report, the commission investigated 22,000 complaints of atrocities and attributed 85 percent 
of them to Salvadoran security forces and right-wing death squads.150 It attributed roughly five 
percent to guerrilla forces directed by the FMLN.151 
American Political and Military Strategy in El Salvador 
In the height of the Cold War, the United States sought to expand their domain of 
influence in an effort to maintain its hegemonic status and prevent communist expansion. In the 
eyes of the Reagan administration, the first step in achieving these objectives rested upon 
exercising control of America’s “backyard.” American policymakers, including Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, saw the necessity of “drawing the line against communist aggression,” 
starting in Central America:152 
“At first blush, it is hard to conceive of any Central American nation presenting a test of 
U.S. credibility. The gross national product of any of these countries is a poor match for 
the annual sales of one of our supermarket chains. In territory, Oregon is larger than 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala combined...U.S. credibility is implicated in 
Central America not because of what these countries are but presumably because of 
where they are located...For a superpower not to intervene to obtain at least the 
appearance of success within its own sphere of influence is thought to communicate 
incompetence or loss of nerve. Allies and enemies in distant lands will think us weak if 
we do not impose our will.”153 
 
In order to obtain control over their Central American sphere of influence, U.S. policymakers 
applied a counterinsurgency strategy rooted in providing U.S. aid, military training, and advisors 
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to impede guerrilla activity and subversion in both El Salvador and Latin America broadly.154 
This strategy was derived from low-intensity conflict doctrine, which is defined as: 
“The political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below 
conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently 
involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity 
conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination 
of...political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts 
are often localized...but contain regional and global security implications.”155  
 
Low-intensity conflict doctrine is divided into four mission categories: (1) “counterinsurgency 
slash insurgency,” (2) “terrorism counteraction,” (3) “peacetime contingency,” and (4) 
“peacekeeping.”156 The following figure, adopted from Colonel Lee Dixon’s briefing, delineate 
crucial components of low-intensity conflict doctrine and the ways in which it can be understood 
within the context of counterinsurgency and the changing nature of warfare:  
 
Figure 2: Examples of Assistance Given to Strategic Allies Situated on Probability and Intensity Scale.157 
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 In applying low-intensity conflict doctrine to counterinsurgency strategy, the United 
States constructed a two-pronged policy: first, “fortify the Salvadoran armed forces to wear 
down the rebels in combat, and [second], bolster democracy so as to weaken the rebels’ claims to 
political legitimacy.”158  The ultimate goals of this policy were the establishment of a 
“responsive, legitimate government and the winning of the voluntary support of the population 
through [land] redistribution and reform…[without] main-force military operations.”159 In order 
to achieve these objectives, policymakers and top military personnel agreed that “democratic 
institutions must be strengthened, a working judicial system must emerge, political violence must 
end, and the Salvadoran military must unequivocally submit to civilian authority.”160  
The American effort focused on executing the following targets in order to propel El 
Salvador toward these sweeping changes: (1) the reform of the Salvadoran armed forces; (2) the 
redistribution of land, particularly that of the peasant population; and (3) the democratization of 
political institutions.161 Complicating factors, such as endemic corruption in the Salvadoran 
armed forces, sustained human rights abuses, and resistance against agrarian reforms inhibited 
U.S. abilities to realize these objectives. In fact, these factors further reinforced “...the cause of 
the very insurgents the armed forces [were] trying to counter, since many Salvadorans [had] 
become convinced that it [was] useless to try to change their authoritarian and stratified society 
through nonviolent efforts.”162 The primary driver of these sentiments was the indiscriminate 
violence employed by state-sponsored paramilitary troops; according to the UN-sanctioned Truth 
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Commission, “organized terrorism, in the form of the so-called “death squads,” became the most 
aberrant manifestation of the escalation of violence. Civilian and military groups engaged in a 
systematic murder campaign with total impunity, while state institutions turned a blind eye.”163  
In their campaign to blindly support the democratic development of El Salvador, the United 
States ignored innumerable pieces of evidence pointing to these atrocious human rights 
committed by their allies. The following figure depicts El Salvador’s positioning on the Political 
Terror Scale from 1975 to 2017:  
 
Figure 3: The Political Terror Scale above draws on reports by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International; PTS codes 
denote state-perpetrated human rights violations, which include killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment. 
Each country is scored on a five-point scale.164  
 
From 1980 to 1992, El Salvador occupied the fourth and fifth levels on the Political 
Terror Scale: level four is characterized by “civil and political rights violations [that] have 
expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a 
common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest 
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themselves in politics or ideas.”165 Level five is categorized by the expansion of terror 
throughout “the whole population…The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or 
thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.”166 The Reagan 
administration in particular ignored these atrocities:  
“Prior to Duarte’s election as president in 1984, the Reagan administration routinely 
maintained that its ally had made dramatic strides in improving its human rights record. 
The White House’s supporters offered several different justifications to support their 
claims, including a drop in death-squad violence, Constituent Assembly and presidential 
elections, and ongoing ‘progress’ in criminal cases in which violence had been 
committed against U.S. citizens.”167  
 
Despite the U.S.’s failed attempts to curb human rights violations at the hands of state-
sponsored actors, American advisors understood that their counterinsurgency policy and strategy 
must be rooted in fostering legitimacy: “Political reform in COIN is meant to create institutions 
that build foundations of support among the people. Its ultimate goal is to bestow national and 
international legitimacy upon the government. In El Salvador, the strategy involved holding 
elections and establishing a viable, moderate political center against the extreme left and 
right.”168 Despite these objectives, many elections excluded the FMLN and smaller leftist parties 
in the country, resulting in continued turmoil and elongating the civil war.169  As a by-product, 
the security status of most civilians remained precarious, particularly as the lack of 
accountability permitted the continuation of atrocities committed on both sides.  
The following tables delineate presidential, parliamentary and congressional elections in 
El Salvador from roughly 1962 to 1992 in order to demonstrate the ways in which various 
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political parties rose to power and provide further detail on the response of insurgent and 
government groups following key elections during the civil war: 
 
Date Presidential Election Outcome Additional Details and Facts 
4/29/1962 Winner: Colonel Adalberto Rivera  Represented 
Party: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
Opposition political parties boycotted the presidential election. 
 
3/5/1967 Winner: Colonel Fidel Sanchez Hernandez 
Represented Party: National Conciliation Party 
(PCN) 
 
2/20/1972 Winner: Colonel Arturo Armando Molina 
Represented Party: National Conciliation Party 
(PCN) 
Opposition political parties claimed election fraud. After the election, 
The People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) was established in opposition to 
the government. Cuba sent military assistance to ERP. 
2/20/1977 Winner: General Carlos Humberto Romero 
Mena 
Represented Party: National Conciliation Party 
(PCN) 
Opposition political parties claimed election fraud. 50,000+ individuals 
protested against the government after the election. Eight demonstrators 
died in political violence between 2/26 and 2/28/1977. 
10/15/1979  Coup D'état - N/A President Romero Mena was deposed in a military coup headed by 
reformist officers. 15+ individuals were killed in political violence on 
10/17/1979.  
10/17/1979 Coup D'état - N/A A five-member civil/military junta gained control of the government and 
dissolved the National Assembly. Violence erupted as government troops 
and demonstrators clashed, resulting in the deaths of 50+ individuals. 
1/3/1980 N/A The three civilian members of the junta resigned and were replaced by 
members of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). 
3/3/1980 N/A Jose Napoleon Duarte of the PDC was appointed to the junta.   
12/22/1980 N/A Jose Napoleon Duarte was appointed as president of the junta. 
4/29/1982 Winner: Alvaro Magana 
Represented Party: Democratic Action (AD) 
Alvaro Magana was elected interim president by the Constituent 
Assembly. 
5/6/1984 Winner: Jose Napoleon Duarte 
Represented Party: Christian Democratic Party 
(PDC) 
The Organization of American States (OAS) sent two observers to 
monitor elections. FMLN guerrillas besieged the Cerron Grande 
hydroelectric station, resulting in 90+ deaths. 
3/19/1989 Winner: Alfredo Cristiani Burkard 
Represented Party: Nationalist Republican 
Alliance (ARENA) 
Under Cristiani’s leadership, the conflict ended via UN-brokered peace 
negotiations that began on 9/15/1989. The civil war officially concluded 
on 1/16/1992.  
 
 
Table 1: A Thirty Year Overview of Presidential Elections and Politics from 1962-1992.170 
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Date Parliamentary and Congressional Election Outcomes Additional Details and Facts 
3/13/1966 Type: Congressional Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 32 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won 15 seats. 
3/12/1968 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 27 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
The PDC won 19 seats. 
3/8/1970 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 34 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
The PDC won 16 seats. 
3/12/1972 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 38 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
The National Opposition Union (UNO) won 7 seats. 
3/10/1974 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 32 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
The PDC won 14 seats. The Armed Forces of National 
Resistance (FARN) was established in opposition to the 
government in 1975. 
3/14/1976 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 52 out of 52 seats in the National Assembly. 
Opposition political parties boycotted the parliamentary 
elections. 
3/18/1978 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
The PCN won 50 out of 54 seats in the National Assembly. 
Opposition political parties boycotted the parliamentary 
elections.  
3/28/1982 Type: Constituent Assembly Elections 
Majority: Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 
The PDC won 24 out of 60 seats in the Constituent 
Assembly.  The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
won 19 seats. The Organization of American States (OAS) 
sent three observers to monitor the elections.   
3/31/1985 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 
The PDC won 33 out of 60 seats in the National Assembly. 
OAS observers monitored the elections.   
3/20/1988 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
ARENA won 30 out of 60 seats in the National Assembly. 
The PDC won 23 seats. OAS observers monitored the 
elections. 
3/10/1991 Type: Parliamentary Elections 
Majority: Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
ARENA won 39 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly.  
The OAS sent 85 observers to monitor the election process 
from January to March, and reported that the elections were 
free and fair. 
 
 
Table 2: A Twenty-Five Year Overview of Parliamentary and Congressional Elections and Politics from 1966-1991.171 
  
As demonstrated by the tables above, “the trappings of democracy co-existed with 
authoritarianism...periodic, flawed elections occurred under a constitution between 1948 and 
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1979, in which military officers usually won the presidency.”172 Left-wingers boycotted many 
elections due to the military and political hegemony of the elites, who, more often than not, 
nullified elections and tampered with results. Despite this legacy of corruption, the conclusion of 
the Salvadoran civil war elicited significant military and political forms. 
The Post-War Peace Process 
 The Chapultepec Peace Accords, signed in January of 1992, outlined the reconstruction 
of the Salvadoran state and introduced a social contract hinged upon obeying the rules of 
representative democracy.173 The leaders of the FMLN and the negotiating team of the 
Salvadoran government, along with ARENA President Alfredo Cristiani, were joined by United 
Nations mediators who supervised much of the peace process. The following provisions and 
reforms were explicitly prescribed in the Accords: 
I. Ceasefire, Demobilization and Disarmament 
A formal ceasefire was ordered and effectuated on February 1, 1992, two weeks after the 
signing of the Accords. FMLN combatants were ordered to concentrate all arms, munitions and 
personnel in fifteen sites around the nation. Similarly, the right-wing armed forces assembled in 
sixty-two barracks. Following the congregation of forces, twenty percent of FMLN combatants 
were able to reintegrate into civilian life throughout predetermined periods over the coming 
weeks, resulting in the end of demobilization on October 31, 1992.174 They had “several options 
with respect to their reintegration: joining the new National Civil Police, participating in the land 
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transfer programme, receiving training in order to set up their own businesses, getting involved 
in the work of NGOs, or working in the structuring of FMLN cadres.”175 
II. Political Reforms 
Perhaps the most integral aspect of the Accords was the formal inclusion of the FMLN, 
led by former combatants and leaders, as a registered, legitimate political party. The Accords 
“did not seek to overcome the causes of the social conflict or existing inequality, but rather 
focused on a legal-institutional reform in which the political parties would be the protagonists of 
the new forms of struggle for state power.”176 Despite the Accords’ shortcomings relating to 
addressing the social and economic problems that precipitated the start of the civil war, it appears 
that the inclusion of the guerrilla group was enough to maintain the post-war peace, particularly 
as they realized their voices could be used to enact changes via political institutions. The creation 
of a new electoral and party system enabled full political representation, which had long been 
inaccessible for left-wingers and representatives of the lower-class, peasant population. In fact, 
the FMLN has become an increasingly successful political party, closely contending for the 
greatest number of seats in the National Assembly against ARENA:177 
 
 
                                               
175 Ramos, López, Quinteros, The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?, p. 9 
176 Ramos, López, Quinteros, The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?, p. 10 
177 Ramos, López, Quinteros, The FMLN and Post-War Politics in El Salvador: From Included to Inclusive Actor?, p. 1 
 Lawry 50 
 
Figure 4: Since 1991, the FMLN has emerged as one of the most highly represented parties in the National Assembly, vying 
against ARENA for the top number of seats since the early 2000s.178  
 
 
III. Military and Intelligence Reforms 
 The Accords placed a strong emphasis upon annihilating the barbaric reputation 
associated with most military factions and groups. Therefore, all parties agreed to the significant 
reduction of military personnel and the surrender of all internal security functions. The three 
existing security forces—the Treasury Police, the National Guard, and the National Police—
were disbanded as well.179 Army counterinsurgency units were dissolved, forced recruitment was 
suspended, and human rights issues brought to the forefront of national security priorities were 
subsequently incorporated into the Accords. Lastly, the military-owned National Intelligence 
Directorate was superseded by the State Intelligence Office (OIE), which was supervised by a 
coalition of civilians reporting directly to the president and managed by the legislative branch.180 
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Initially, the induction of civilian leaders into groups monopolizing the use of force transformed 
the reputation and efficacy of the military. However, over the course of time, corruption and a 
systemic absence of accountability hindered these improvements. 
IV. Police Force Reforms 
 In an effort to concentrate many of the bureaucratic institutions pertaining to security in 
the hands of civilians, the Accords erected the National Civilian Police (PNC), the only national-
level public security force, as a branch of the Defense Ministry. Roughly 60 percent of both 
officer level and basic agent personnel of the PNC were to be civil applicants; in other words, 
people who have never served as combatants before.181 Their primary functions included 
maintaining order and protecting civilians.182 The legislative branch held the power to discharge 
the director of the PNC for human rights abuses committed by the force at any time, thereby 
installing a preliminary system of checks and balances.183 Lastly, the Accords abolished the draft 
law and outlined a mandatory entrance exam. As demonstrated by reforms regarding the 
military, adjustments made to the police forces succeeded on a surface-level only. Over time, 
waves of crime permeated the new system as it became clear that the judicial branch lacked the 
necessary structure and backbone to provide accountability. 
V. Human Rights and Judicial Politics 
 Rectifying the human rights violations and atrocities committed during the war was a 
crucial aspect of the Accords, which mandated the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to review 
military officer files and recommend names to be purged from military institutions.184 The 
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United Nations supervised a Truth Commission, which prepared a report designed to hold the 
members of the right-wing military forces and FMLN combatants accountable for the atrocities 
committed, particularly those against civilians. Although the Accords largely glossed over 
judicial reforms, they did grant increased autonomy of the National Judicial Council from the 
Supreme Court, which resulted in fewer conflict-of-interest cases and created a more even 
balance of power.185 Generally, the absence of reforms to the judiciary set the stage for a 
fragmented security sector able to provide the necessary force to limit violence, but disinclined 
to hold offenders accountable for their actions.  
VI. Implementation 
 In order to ensure that the reforms mentioned above came to fruition, the National 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was “responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of all political agreements reached by the parties.”186 COPAZ consisted of two 
representatives each from the government and the FMLN, plus one representative from each 
established political party so as to guarantee accountability and the inclusion of all sides. 
COPAZ was largely successful; neither side ever broke the ceasefire, COPAZ served as an 
intermediary when questions or resistance surfaced, and smooth reintegration and civilianization 
were predominantly successful for former combatants on both sides.187  
Post-War Democratic Electoral Processes 
 In December of 1992, the transition to democracy officially occurred and the FMLN 
became a formally registered political party, therefore legitimizing their participation in 
subsequent elections. The Electoral Division of ONUSAL was established in September of 1993, 
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“with a mandate to observe the electoral process before, during and after the elections under the 
following terms of reference:  
(a) to observe that measures and decisions made by all electoral authorities were 
impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections;  
(b) to observe that appropriate steps were taken to ensure that eligible voters were 
included in the electoral rolls, thus enabling them to exercise their right to vote;  
(c) to observe that mechanisms were in place effectively to prevent multiple voting, given 
that a complete screening of the electoral rolls prior to the elections was not feasible;  
(d) to observe that freedom of expression, organization, movement and assembly were 
respected without restrictions;  
(e) to observe that potential voters had sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms for 
participating in the election;  
(f) to examine, analyse and assess criticisms made, objections raised and attempts 
undertaken to delegitimize the electoral process and, if required, to convey such 
information to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal;  
(g) to inform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of complaints received regarding 
irregularities in electoral advertising or possible interference with the electoral process; 
when appropriate, to request information on corrective measures taken by the Tribunal; 
(h) to place observers at all polling sites on election day to verify that the right to vote 
was fully respected.”188  
 
In 1994, municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections took place; ARENA won the 
presidency and a majority of both legislative seats and municipal governments, but a party 
coalition spearheaded by the FMLN forced ARENA into a second round of voting for the 
presidency.189 According to state-collected consensus results, “the first post-war elections had a 
generally positive effect on party development…El Salvador’s party scene expanded beyond the 
three-party clique of the ‘official’ PCN, the opposition PDC and ARENA to include the rebel 
movement-turned-political party FMLN, as well as the new United Democratic Centre 
(CDU).”190 Additionally, the secretary-general acknowledged positive improvements in the 
expansion of the electoral roles, participation by the political parties throughout the whole 
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process, the peaceful exercise of the right to organize, the right of assembly, and freedom of 
expression, the lack of violent incidents, and the successes of the security and armed forces in 
protecting civilians and their rights.191 ONUSAL observers did not record any fraudulent or illicit 
practices that meaningfully impacted the results of all elections.192  
Over the course of the subsequent decade, the FMLN became the second most powerful 
party in the country; despite losing the presidential elections to ARENA in 1999, they were able 
to gain a plurality of seats in the legislature in 2000 and 2003.193 Further success was 
exemplified in the elections of the early 2000s, as other left-wing groups gained traction as well: 
“In subsequent elections between 1997 and 2006, some of the new left-wing parties 
proved able to challenge the much older, ‘traditional’ parties, which led to the decline of 
the once-powerful PCN and PDC. ARENA consolidated, the CD/CDU entered as a small 




The lack of violence surrounding democratic and electoral processes can likely be 
attributed at least in part to the inclusion of former guerrillas into the political sphere, the 
disbandment of armed forces and insurgents coupled with their reintegration into society, and the 
presence of a supervising third-party. The representation of formerly excluded and marginalized 
members of the population created a peaceful means to express discontent, rather than resorting 
to the use of violence. Additionally, the structure of the Accords facilitated peace for a variety of 
reasons: (1) despite the prominence of the United Nations in mediating, the Accords heralded 
practices that were integrable into domestic political, military and social institutions, as opposed 
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to ones that were partial to the desires of external actors; (2) the reintegration of former 
combatants proved vital in reviving a sense of normalcy and discouraging any further use of 
violence; (3) the absence of the United States in the negotiating and peace process was likely a 
contributing factor. Their involvement in the war via complicity in the protraction of state-
sanctioned violence and their association with self-interested state-building would have likely 
angered Salvadorans.  
Today, El Salvador’s post-war rebuilding process has been championed by democratic 
crusaders all over the world, who cite the reconstruction era as one of the most successful and 
lasting examples of democratization: 
“El Salvador is now considered among the most successful instances of implementation 
of a negotiated peace agreement in the post-Cold War period. The cease-fire between the 
two sides was never broken. By 1994, guerrilla forces were demobilised and reconstituted 
as a political party; significant demilitarisation of society and the state had taken place; 
and elections had transpired through which the former guerrillas became the second most 
powerful party in the country. The peace accords were the catalyst for the incipient 
institutionalisation of political democracy in El Salvador.”195 
 
Furthermore, “international actors remained enamoured with improved human rights 
performance, enhanced civilian control, and reduced threats to internal and international 
security.”196 Despite these successes, many Salvadorans themselves have shed light on the 
shortcomings of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, and the ensuing political and social gaps that 
have manifested themselves throughout the past three decades. Although levels of violence 
remained low surrounding electoral and democratic processes, other forms of violence 
manifested throughout the post-war period and compromised the security of civilians. Gang 
violence and organized crime rates continue to remain lofty today. The final pages of this chapter 
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will reconcile these conflicting narratives through the examination of post-war security 
institutions and practices.  
Post-War Security and Justice 
 Post-conflict reconstruction is particularly important with regard to the restoration and 
establishment of the coercive apparatus. A condition known as “the security gap” can undermine 
the process of democratization and the legitimacy of the incumbent regime:  
“When indigenous military or security forces are dismantled and new civilian police 
forces have not yet been recruited, trained, and deployed, international peacekeepers, 
military personnel, or other types of monitors frequently exercise temporary control over 
the immediate security situation until new police, trained by internationals, begin their 
deployment. This period is always the most dangerous both for order and security and for 
state legitimacy...unchecked, these environments are the perfect soil for spoilers with 
strong incentives and means to destabilize and discredit new governments.”197  
 
Thus, provisions outlined in the Accords placed heavy emphasis on the erection of security-
enhancing institutions and rules of law. Due to the exorbitant levels of violence against civilians 
during the war, human rights became the forerunner of international discourse and national 
reforms. As demonstrated above, much of the peace agreement was centered around obstructing 
the recurrence of these atrocities; however, the provisions focused more on the “security arena 
and on redressing past abuses than on constructing a reformed judiciary.”198  
The complicity of the judicial branch in both war-time human rights abuses and post-war 
corruption is often obscured by the culpability of the military forces, but remains no less 
significant. Many even cite the abuse of power and lack of accountability as one of the primary 
drivers behind the civil war.199 Those who were excluded from fair judicial proceedings before 
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the war continued to be excluded following the war: “The justice system, so frequently cited as 
key in the post-war period, has struggled to establish itself as a fully independent and credible 
institution, capable of imparting justice to all, regardless of social or political position...”200 
Accordingly, many of the reforms outlined in the Accords fell short of instituting lasting change 
with regards to the judiciary: 
“In contrast to the judiciary’s nonparticipation in the negotiations, representatives of the 
armed forces were at the negotiating table and played a crucial role in ensuring a 
successful outcome. On a formal level, the armed forces are part of the executive branch 
and subordinate to the president; the Supreme Court is not.”201 
 
These shortcomings, coupled with societal and cultural resistance to several security reforms laid 
out in the Accords, resulted in the reappearance of violence of staggering proportions following 
the war. In some categories, El Salvador eclipsed Colombia and vied with South Africa as “the 
homicide capital of the world.”202 
 In democracies, a properly functioning judiciary should sanction the illegal use of 
violence by “monitor[ing] state institutions in the security sector and beyond. Independence and 
autonomy of the judiciary should promote the accountability of the police and the military to the 
rule of law.”203 Unfortunately, the reforms included in the Accords did not engender the 
accountability and security necessary to curb unchecked violence and crime. The following 
series of phases demarcate the waves of crime and spikes in violence that engulfed the state 
following the termination of the war: 
In the first phase, from 1991 to 1995, the transition of power from military to civilian 
forces during demobilization and the ceasefire resulted in a power vacuum that many took 
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advantage of in order to commit violent crime.204 While the reforms laid out in the Accords were 
particularly successful with respect to political integration and civilianization, they failed to 
predict the law-enforcing void left in the wake of demobilization and the purging of military 
forces.  
In the second phase, between 1995 and 1997, most of the reforms had been implemented 
but crime remained at lofty levels. The population perceived the inability of the government and 
security forces to “deliver and security,” and roughly 45 percent “believed in 1996 that people 
had a right to take justice into their own hands. In some cases, people bypassed the judicial 
system.”205 Nevertheless, “El Salvador continued to serve as a model for international post-
conflict police reform. By the late 1990s, the contrast was striking between the positive 
international opinion of security sector reforms in El Salvador and the decidedly more mixed 
domestic opinion.”206  
In the third phase, from 1997 into the early 2000s, crime decreased due to the 
consolidation and increased efficacy of police and security forces, a common pattern following 
democratization.207 A survey conducted in 2001 demonstrated that, by a margin of roughly two 
to one, “respondents believed the PNC to be more efficient, professional, rights-respecting and 
honest than five years earlier. Once past the initial transition period, policing practice 
demonstrated a greater capacity to approximate formal doctrine, and reform patterns resembled 
those of stable democracies.”208 However, of the crime that did occur during this period, much of 
it attributed to this phase was perpetrated by members of the PNC, in which “repeated revelation 
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of PNC agents’ involvement in organised kidnappings and robberies” came to light.209 These 
levels of corruption shed light on enduring institutional deficiencies.  
As stated above, the limited reforms pertaining to the judiciary depended heavily upon 
international support, primarily that of the United Nations.210 While international actors 
contributed considerably to the Truth Commission, Salvadorans had limited success in the 
construction of new laws and the erection of new institutions. According to scholars, the process 
of national reconciliation that involves the acknowledgement of responsibility for human rights 
abuses cannot be imposed or administered by international actors.211 In fact, external efforts may 
actually be detrimental to the rebuilding process, as they can provoke adverse responses from 
nationalists. As mentioned above, the involvement of the United States in the post-war peace 
process would have likely resulted in renewed violence, especially given that “changing 
entrenched attitudes and practices is far more difficult than outside actors tend to appreciate.”212 
Furthermore, 
“unless domestic civil society is deeply involved in the process of establishing 
accountability for past injustices and in building durable legal codes, courts, and police 
systems, international assistance, even in the best of circumstances, will leave democracy 
unconsolidated and vulnerable to the return of abusive past practices.”213 
 
The combination of external support for judicial reforms and the lack of civilian involvement at 
the negotiating table resulted in shortcomings pertaining to the judiciary.  In a national opinion 
survey conducted between July and August of 1996, researchers conducted the following 
research regarding law, the Supreme Court and the Constitution: 
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Figure 7: Responses to the question, which of the following best describes the Salvadoran judicial system?216  
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 In a question regarding institutional power, over 70 percent of the Salvadoran population 
agreed that the Constitution and national laws granted the Supreme Court too much power. This, 
in combination with the fact that “it proved easier to change institutions than to change state-
society relations, and civilianisation brought only a partial redefinition of police-society 
relations,” resulted in the crime wave referenced above.217 The relations between the Supreme 
Court and the PNC with society did not exhibit the degree of trust and integration present in most 
established democracies, thus enabling gangs to employ violent tactics, often unanswered, at 
their leisure.  
Conclusions 
The political stipulations defined in the Accords were largely successful with regard to 
curtailing violence associated with electoral processes and preventing a regression back to civil 
war. As mentioned above, the integration of the FMLN into the political arena distilled many of 
the tensions and sentiments of unequal representation during the pre-war era. Despite these 
successes, the state of security in other spheres remained compromised, particularly with regard 
to organized crime and corruption in the judicial sector. This public security gap has been 
exploited by ordinary civilians due to the lack of judicial reform that continues to subvert the 
safety and security of the population. The lack of accountability has contributed to diminished 
perceptions of state legitimacy, as civilians consistently do not believe the judicial branch will 
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Chapter III: The Iraq War (2003-2011) 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze the drastic discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-
war rebuilding efforts, many of which deteriorated under the ensuing security vacuum, sectarian 
violence and the rise of terrorist organizations. In answering my research question, democratic 
elections and electoral processes often had detrimental effects on the state of security, 
particularly due to the underrepresentation and exclusion of particular ethnic and religious 
groups in political processes. With that said, it is difficult to causally link the two; many 
contributing factors played a role in spikes of violence. 
I argue that the post-invasion peace process was hindered by three primary factors: (1) 
the exclusion of Sunni Arabs, who represented former elites, from the political arena fueled the 
insurgency, thereby compromising crucial rebuilding processes and inciting sectarian divisions; 
(2) coalition forces and Iraqi politicians prioritized electoral processes ahead of the re-
establishment of the coercive apparatus and institutions, which undermined the security of 
civilians, many of whom turned to insurgents for protection; (3) the eight-year American 
occupation encouraged the emergence of anti-western terrorist groups that further compromised 
stability and threatened democratic procedures.  
These failures, coupled with the regional turmoil that has threatened the stability of most 
Middle Eastern nations, has left Iraq bureaucratically shattered, militarily weak, and internally 
divided. The following sections provide an overview of 20th century state-building, which 
played a large role in curtailing democratic success; the invasion and subsequent discrepancies 
between pre-war planning and post-war rebuilding; and resulting bureaucratic voids that enabled 
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the pervasion of multi-faceted violence. I will examine the January 2005 elections, the December 
2005 elections, and the March 2010 elections in conjunction with security.  
Key Terminology 
 
   Sectarianism: excessive devotion to a particular sect, usually pertaining to religion. 
   Shi’ism: a branch of Islam which holds that the Islamic prophet Muhammad designated Ali ibn 
Abi Talib as his successor, or Caliph. Shi’a Islam primarily contrasts with Sunni Islam, whose 
adherents maintain that Muhammad did not appoint a successor. 
   Sunnism: the largest denomination of Islam. The differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims 
resulted from a disagreement over the choice of Muhammad’s successor and subsequently 
acquired broader political, theological and juridical differences. 
   Ba’athism: an nationalist, secular ideology promoting a type of pan-Arab socialism.  
   Federalism: a system possessing at least two levels of government, typically federal and 
regional, with separate powers allocated to each level by means of a written constitution. 
   Closed-List Voting System: voters select a party, not a candidate, they support on polling day.   
   Compensatory Seats: seats given to lists that do not win any seat in any province but have a 
collective number of votes that exceed the national threshold. 
   National Seats: seats distributed among the winners at the provincial level, according to how 
many votes or seats they receive nation-wide. 
   Threshold: the minimum number of votes that political entities should win in order to gain one 
or more seats. 
 
A Historical Overview: The Roots of the Invasion and Subsequent Civil War 
 In order to understand the rise of the insurgency entrenched in ethnic and sectarian 
divides in Iraq’s current political makeup, it is first important to analyze the roots of Iraq’s 
modern political system and the evolution of Sunni-Shi’a-Kurdish relations. The following 
introductory section will illustrate this evolution by investigating modern Iraqi history, which 
can be divided into five distinct phases: (1) World War I state formation; (2) traditional 
constitutional monarchy; (3) military authoritarian regime; (4) totalitarian Ba’ath regime; (5) 
post-invasion state reconstruction.218 
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1916-1920: WWI State Formation 
During World War I, British bureaucrats promised independence to many Middle Eastern 
states under Ottoman Rule. The government’s Arab bureau in Cairo “issued letters and 
proclamations” detailing “the vision of an independent pan-Arab state, stretching from the 
Persian frontier to the Suez Canal.”219 Money proved consequential in “buying tribal allegiance,” 
and soon thereafter, the British organized “bands of Arab fighters as guerrillas to destroy 
railroads and attack enemy outposts” against Ottoman Turks.220 Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the 
scores of Arab guerrillas fighting on behalf of the Allied Powers, policy-makers in Europe drew 
up arrangements for the division of the Ottoman Empire among the French, British and Imperial 
Russians.  
Following the end of World War I, in April of 1920, the British government reneged on 
their promises of independence and “formally accepted responsibility for building an Iraqi state 
out of the post-war wreckage of the Ottoman Empire.”221 Of the Middle Eastern states, only Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen obtained true sovereignty; in contrast, “the remaining states, owing 
their borders to the arbitrary actions of distant British and French bureaucrats drawing maps to 
reflect their nations’ respective interests, fell under either the new League of Nations mandate 
system or direct British or French colonial administration.”222 British Officer T.E. Lawrence 
implored policy-makers to grant sovereignty: 
“There has been a deplorable contrast between our profession and our practice...We said 
we went to Mesopotamia to defeat Turkey. We said we stayed to deliver the Arabs from 
the oppression of the Turkish Government, and to make available for the world its 
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resources of corn and oil. We spent nearly a million men and nearly a thousand million of 
money to keep these ends...Our government is worse than the old Turkish system.”223 
 
 1920-1958: Traditional Constitutional Monarchy 
 
T.E. Lawrence’s words went unheeded, and Britain sent financial aid and military 
personnel to Iraq, signifying the beginning of their domain. Angered Iraqi tribes, resentful 
toward yet another imperial power, revolted against British rule in the summer of 1920. The 
rebellion achieved a mixed outcome: on the one hand, it failed in that it was violently suppressed 
by British troops and bombers, but on the other, it succeeded in convincing policy-makers in 
London that direct rule would be unfeasibly costly.224 A solution was found in Prince Faisal, the 
second son of the Sharif of Mecca and “newly exiled” from a temporary throne in Syria under 
the French.225 Prince Faisal became a pro-British, Sunni monarch installed to preside over Iraq; 
in order to provide the facade of democracy, “Sir Percy Cox, the new British high commissioner 
in Baghdad, had Faisal’s main rival deported...and arranged for a plebiscite of the adult male 
population.”226 Just years after the conclusion of World War I, Iraq became a constitutional 
monarchy with an elected parliament, and King Faisal took the throne with 96 percent of the vote 
in what became a “clearly rigged referendum.”227  
Unifying Iraq under its newly delineated (and illogical) borders proved challenging, 
particularly with regard to sectarian and religious considerations. The Ottoman Empire had 
divided modern-day Iraq into three regions, each under the control of a separate governor with 
“little in common with the other two.”228 Throughout his reign, King Faisal propounded a pan-
Arab ideology bent on consolidating an expansive yet unified state across the region, which 
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inspired a cohort of Arab intellectuals who flocked to Iraq to join him. These lofty blueprints 
were never achieved, however, because British officials occupied the majority of posts in key 
ministries, military forces, and controlled all aspects of foreign policy and security matters. 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, King Faisal served as a puppet to British string-pullers, 
possessing no real power. 
In 1932, due to economic struggles and new leadership in London, the British gave up its 
mandate, instead granting sovereignty to Iraq as a constitutional monarchy with an elected 
parliament, an institutionalized legal system and its own armed forces.229 Despite the facade of 
stability, the newly founded Iraqi state was decentralized, segregated and lacked institutional 
legitimacy. The “democratic credentials” of parliament were restricted, urban leaders were 
isolated from rural tribes, and the constituent assembly granted the king significant capabilities, 
thus leading to a dangerous consolidation of power.230 In a 1917 report titled “Faisal’s Table 
Talk,” King Faisal referred to Iraqis as “unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any 
national consciousness or sense of unity, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, 
receptive to evil, prone to anarchy and always willing to rise against the government.”231 In an 
effort to strengthen his regime, King Faisal appointed a coalition of Sunni elitists and 
intellectuals to top positions within his government, despite the fact that Sunnis represented a 
minority within the country. The Sunni population had largely accepted Ottoman rule during the 
Empire, gravitated toward major cities, and therefore dominated politics in Baghdad and 
occupied positions within the bureaucracy and the officer corps.232  
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Despite this Sunni-based consolidation of power, King Faisal strove to unify the country 
under the pan-Arab ideology. His campaign largely failed, however, due to “tribal tensions and 
the increasingly stratified class system” rooted in Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divisions and ethnic 
discord between Arabs and non-Arabs.233 The following pie chart depicts the approximate ethno-
religious composition of the roughly 3 million Iraqi inhabitants at the beginning of the mandate 
period: 
 
Figure 8: The break-down of religious affiliation in the pre-Mandate era, conceptually created from Pederson’s analysis in 
“Getting out of Iraq.”234 
 
 
The National Assembly consistently reflected the interests of the property-owning population, 
while the property-less, which encompassed mostly Shi’as, Kurds, Jews and Yazidis, became 
more and more marginalized by political policies.235 The anticipated “boom” from oil revenues 
failed to surface until decades later, further exacerbating tensions and inequality among socio-
economic classes.236 Additionally, King Faisal banned political parties that opposed the 
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monarchy and Iraq’s dependence on Britain, thus consolidating Sunni-based rule and further 
disenfranchising the under-represented Shi’a majority and other sects: “To the Shi’a in the south 
and the Kurds of the north, the nominally national Iraqi government in Baghdad looked 
increasingly like Sunni domination.”237  
 In 1933, King Faisal died and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who was “openly anti-
British and a fervent believer in the pan-Arab cause.”238 He possessed marginal political power 
over rural regions and tribesmen, instead utilizing the army to suppress inklings of discontent. 
Over the next decade, the army became “a central actor in a tangled political process that set Left 
against Right, the cities against the tribes, pan-Arabists against nationalists, Sunni against Shi’a 
and Kurd.”239 The consolidation of Iraqi power and heightened anti-British sentiment increased 
when Ghazi died in 1939 and a pro-British prime minister named Nuri Said was installed.240  
Within a year, Rashid Ali, an extreme “Anglo-phobe,” had seized power and launched a 
coup d’état against the monarchy. With Hitler’s support, he attempted to rid Iraq of British 
influence and personnel, but to no avail: “At war’s end, little seemed to have changed in the 
Middle East. Britain continued to run the Suez Canal. It based troops in, and exerted massive 
influence on, the nominally independent states of Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan.”241 In 1948, Iraq was 
engulfed in violence again when Iraqis protested against the Portsmouth Treaty, yet another 
British attempt to exercise control over Iraq. In response to uprisings, Said banned political 
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parties, closed newspapers, publicly executed prominent Communists, and expanded the police 
and military presence.242 He also refused to hold elections in 1952.243  
 1958-1968: Military Authoritarian Regime 
While his iron fist was initially successful in repressing dissenters, it failed in 1958 when 
Said was ousted in a military coup d’état by General Abd el-Karim Qasim, who transformed Iraq 
from a monarchy to a republic.244 This transition was representative of resistance against 
imperialist elites, and wrought stark changes to institutions and internal politics: 
“The downfall of the monarchy in July 1958 was a revolt against the social structure 
dominated by the pro-British ruling class and elite of the society. The middle class and 
military dominated, populist and authoritarian regimes assumed power. They abolished 
the legislative and legal institutions and a new system was established, with no 
institutionalized constitutional process and accountability.”245 
 
Although Qasim received broader popular support than Said, his administration continued to 
further marginalize Shi’a and Kurdish populations, excluding them almost entirely from political 
decision-making processes.246 This era sowed the seeds for the beginning of sectarian activism: 
“The state’s ever-increasing authoritarianism was accompanied by an intensification of Shi’a 
activism...This resulted in the sharpening of the state’s suspicions of political Shiism and of the 
mobilization of Shi’a identity that in turn served to deepen Shi’a resentment and broaden support 
for Shi’a-centric movements.”247 In response, Qasim employed violent tactics in an effort to 
consolidate power and increased the responsibilities and presence of military officers, a legacy 
that continued until the American invasion in 2003. Despite Qasim’s near monopoly over the use 
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of force via the heightening of military power, the era was characterized by political instability; 
from 1958 to 1968, the political system suffered four military takeovers, numerous failed 
assassination attempts and rapid transitions of power from president to president.248  
Lastly, Qasim was opposed by the Ba’athist Party, which was established in 1941 in 
Syria and promoted secularism, socialism and pan-Arabism.249 To the dismay of members of the 
Ba’athist party, Qasim felt that strengthening Iraq internally took precedence over the 
establishment of a cross-national Arab state.250 In 1963, the Ba’athists successfully overthrew 
Qasim and consolidated power by 1968, “thanks in part to the ruthless efficiency of the secret 
police chief, Saddam Hussein.”251  
1968-2003: Totalitarian Ba’athist Regime 
In 1968, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president of Iraq, aided by Saddam Hussein who, 
at the time, headed the internal intelligence and security agencies.252 In 1972, President Bakr 
announced the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company industry under the slogan, “Arab 
oil for the Arabs.”253 Fuel prices spiked significantly over the following months, quadrupling 
Iraq’s oil revenues.254 While the Ba’athist regime siphoned much of this newfound wealth into 
the military and security apparati, it also invested heavily in education and infrastructure.255 Over 
the course of the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq’s middle class ballooned, its infrastructure developed, 
and schools expanded to accommodate swaths of formerly illiterate people. This facade of 
modernization masked internal political turbulence, however; in 1979, Saddam Hussein forcibly 
                                               
248 Amirsadeghi, Hossein. The Security of the Persian Gulf. Vol. 26, Routledge, 2011., p. 200 
249 Nazir, “Democracy, Islam and Insurgency in Iraq,” p. 48    
250 Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” p. 38  
251 Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” p. 39  
252 Macfarquhar, Neil. “Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies.” The New York Times, The New York 
Times, 30 Dec. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html. 
253 Dietrich, Christopher R. W. “Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs: Raw Material Sovereignty, Cold War Boundaries, and the Nationalisation of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967–1973.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:3, 2011.  
254 “History of Iraq Part II: The Rise of Saddam Hussein.” Public Radio International, www.pri.org/stories/2003-02-12/history-iraq-part-ii-rise-
saddam-hussein. 
255 “History of Iraq Part II: The Rise of Saddam Hussein.” Public Radio International. 
 Lawry 71 
ascended to the presidency and purged many members of the party’s Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) in an unflinching show of power. The following years were characterized by 
further consolidations of power and the centralization of the state bureaucracy: 
“The rise of a totalitarian, patrimonial political system established by the Ba’ath Party 
was a response to the need for a stable political system. A highly centralized system was 
established under the Ba’ath Party...The executive, legislative and judicial departments 
were all merged under the tight control of a self-defined body, the Revolutionary 
Command Council. Under it, a formidable controlling machine was established; 
bureaucracy, the military and security agencies expanded their role massively.”256   
 Saddam’s “stable political system” was undermined by his frequent military ventures 
outside of Iraq. In 1980, Hussein attempted to topple the new Islamic, Shi’a-dominated 
government in neighboring Iran; a military stalemate in 1988 ended the conflict, which ravaged 
both countries economically and left over 200,000 Iraqis dead.257 Debt from the war, which 
exceeded $70 billion, embroiled Iraq further in tensions with surrounding countries.258 When 
Iraq’s wealthy neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded financial reimbursement for their 
aid during the war, Saddam responded by invading Kuwait in August of 1990 under the guise of 
protecting Iraqi oil reserves.259 He was swiftly defeated by an American-led coalition seven 
months later and challenged by Iraqis who internalized American appeals to revolt against 
Saddam’s ruthless administration.260 In the wake of national humiliation and the diminution of 
Saddam’s political legitimacy, empowered members of the Shi’a and Kurdish populations 
revolted against Hussein’s brutal regime:261 
“Within a few days of the February 28 ceasefire...led by Kurdish forces in the north and 
Shi’as in the south, uprisings broke out in 17 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. These uprisings 
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would have profound implications for the second Gulf War. The uprisings in southern 
Iraq seem to have been driven by urban Shi’ites tired of Sunni Ba’athist rule, often joined 
by disaffected members of the Iraqi military as it retreated from Kuwait.”262  
 
Unfortunately, these uprisings were unsuccessful; Saddam extinguished them mercilessly. An 
estimated 45,000 Shi’as were killed ruthlessly, and over 1.5 million Kurds were displaced as 
they fled Saddam’s widely feared Republican Guard.263 In the wake of this humanitarian crisis, 
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, which demanded 
an “immediate end” to the repression of Iraqi civilians and “immediate access by international 
humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq.”264 
 The combination of war, economic distress, and the increased interest of foreign patrons 
in groups opposing Saddam’s reign contributed to the quiet rise of sect-centric politics 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Shi’a Arabs, in particular, believed that they were 
“uniquely victimized by the regime...coupled with an equally strong sense of entitlement based 
on their demographic weight.”265 Their inclination toward sect-centric politics and the 
acceleration of outright opposition to Saddam was emboldened by the following: (1) the 
disintegration of pan-Arab ideology and the demise of the communist party; (2) the politicization 
of Shi’ism in Iran following the revolutions of 1979; (3) the Gulf War and subsequent uprisings; 
and (4) amplified democracy promotion rhetoric and the encouragement of opposition groups by 
military powers like the United States.266 While undoubtedly much of this sectarianism rose from 
extreme resentment regarding Saddam Hussein’s regime, the United States played a significant 
role in stoking the flames of discontent: 
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“The major players in the Iraqi opposition had adopted the principle of ethno-sectarian 
quotas as the arbiter of political representation and entitlement...as early as 1992. There 
have been criticisms singling out the United States as the mastermind behind the divisive 
policy and...the political elevation of ethno-sectarian identities more generally...”267 
 
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, Saddam’s administration refused United 
Nations weapons inspectors the access necessary to register and destroy unconventional 
weapons, a stipulation specifically outlined in the Gulf War ceasefire agreement.268 A series of 
economic sanctions dispensed by the U.N. battered Iraq’s economy, devastating the Iraqi 
populace but allowing Saddam to reap the benefits of off the record oil trades.269 Covertly, the 
U.S. began funding various opposition groups, such as the Iraqi National Congress and the 
Kurdish Democratic Party, the ultimate objective being the deposition of Saddam Hussein.270 By 
early 2001, President George W. Bush and his administration openly supported regime change in 
Iraq. 
The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, executed by terrorist organization al Qaeda, 
and the corresponding war on terror rapidly accelerated the Bush administration’s plans to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein, particularly as restricting the possibility of future attacks shifted to 
the forefront of American foreign policy. Over the following months, Bush constructed a 
national security strategy driven by concern over the possibility of two primary activities: (1) the 
use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies; and (2) 
Iraqi state sponsorship of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.271 President Bush, reminded of months 
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of Iraqi non-compliance with United Nation regulations and standards relating to illicit weapons, 
introduced a doctrine of preemption, which set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.272 
On March 17th, President Bush issued a press release outlining the case for military 
action and provided Saddam Hussein and his two sons a 48-hour window to leave Iraq.273 Over 
the course of the next two days, it became clear that Iraq’s unyielding leader would not comply 
with American demands.274 Subsequently, Operation Iraqi Freedom was initiated on March 19th, 
2003, a campaign intended to destroy Iraq’s supposed cache of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), overthrow Saddam Hussein, and install a democratic, pro-American regime in the heart 
of the Middle East.275 American, British, and other coalition forces quickly overwhelmed 
Hussein’s forces, seizing control of Baghdad and other major cities in a matter of weeks.  
On April 9, 2003, a crowd of Iraqi civilians and American troops destroyed a statue of 
Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, a symbolic triumph over Saddam’s dictatorial regime.276 
On April 10, President Bush delivered an address to the Iraqi people outlining the objectives of 
the coalition, emphasizing its short timeline and democratic goals in the post-war rebuilding 
process. Three weeks later, on May 1, President Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations in Iraq.277  
2003-Present: Post-Invasion State Reconstruction 
 In examining the reconstruction effort, it is first important to acknowledge the 
discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-war realities. The Bush administration 
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undertook extensive measures to ensure the peaceful and seamless transition of power from 
provisional authorities to elected Iraqi leadership, many of which failed to anticipate post-war 
realities and the proliferation of insurgent forces.  
Pre-war planning for post-war governance began in 1998 with the Iraqi Liberation Act, 
which allocated $98 million for the training of Iraqi exiles and opposition groups but was 
confined to nonlethal means.278 In 2001, the Bush administration initiated military planning; U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Tommy Franks presented an initial 
concept of operations to Secretary Rumsfield, encompassing a four-phase course of action. Phase 
IV, which was undertaken by Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), “covered 
‘post-hostility operations,’ [and] was intended to produce a representative Iraqi government.”279 
Retrospectively, many of these plans neglected to address alternative realities to the following: 
“Planners assumed that military operations would have a clear and decisive end, in other 
words that there would not be extensive post-war resistance by Iraqi forces; that the 
coalition would have to deal with serious humanitarian crises, including flows of refugees 
and internally displaced people; that the coalition could rapidly hand over civil 
governance to robust Iraqi governing institutions such as the line ministries and the 
police; and that most Iraqis would embrace the political transition to a ‘new Iraq’ and 
actively support democratization of the political system.”280 
 
In October of 2002, President Bush allocated $92 million to train Iraqi exile militias and armed 
opposition groups outside of Iraq; over the following months, CIA operatives became active 
inside Iraq as well, training Kurdish fighters in the north, Shi’as in the south, and “buying 
loyalty” from exiled Iraqi politicians and elites.281 The rationale behind the provision of aid and 
training was concentrated on the notion that Iraqi exiles and Kurds would play leading roles in 
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Iraq’s post-war transition to democratic governance, which additionally “rested on the 
assumption that the population would accept exiles as legitimate leaders, Iraq’s governmental 
infrastructure would be easily transferred to new leadership, and overall political transformation 
would be rapid and relatively easy.”282 In the summer of 2002, the Bush administration initiated 
an interagency planning process under the National Security Council’s Executive Steering Group 
(ESG), which was established and supported by an Iraq Political-Military Cell; it was designed 
to provide post-war relief, security sector reform, and an outline for state reconstruction.283 In 
January of 2003, President Bush gave the Department of Defense (DoD) the lead role in post-war 
planning, which consequently established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs 
(ORHA). Along with the State Department, the DoD and OHRA coordinated plans to de-
Ba’athify bureaucratic institutions and reinstate reformed Iraqi armed forces.  
 Prior to the start of combat operations in March of 2003, the U.S. government anticipated 
a post-war political transition managed by Iraqi exiles, many of which had been involved in the 
pre-war planning effort as demonstrated above. According to various media reports, “several 
Iraqi exiles lobbied Congress and the White House years before the commencement of combat 
operations in Iraq and...certain individuals had developed influential relationships with different 
branches and agencies in the U.S. government.”284 It became clear that this meticulously planned 
transition of power possessed gaps from the beginning of American occupation of Baghdad: 
“As U.S. troops moved into Baghdad, the city quickly fell into a state of anarchy. Angry 
citizens stormed through Baghdad’s neighborhoods, looting and destroying buildings 
associated with Saddam’s rule. The destruction caused by weeks of lawlessness in the 
city created several problems for political transition. First, looters took property that was 
essential infrastructure for running a government, including computers, phones, copy 
machines, and even desks and chairs. These items needed to be replaced before ministries 
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could function again. Second, many government buildings were burned or demolished, 
destroying important documents necessary for running the government. Third, the sense 
of lawlessness had a negative psychological impact on the city, which made coalition 
forces’ efforts to gain the public’s trust more difficult. All these factors hindered the 
development of national governance structures.”285 
 
In addition to the post-war destruction, pre-war Iraq lacked the institutional strength and 
bureaucratic capacity to provide a baseline for nation-building endeavors. Despite its facade of 
modernization, Iraq failed to develop the “substance” of a modern state under Saddam Hussein’s 
repressive reign: it faced economic distress and high levels of debt, the military possessed 
extensive powers, and the state lacked any form of civil society.286 Perhaps most important of all, 
Iraqi society under Saddam Hussein and his predecessors had long championed the fusion of 
politics and violence, which has had lasting and detrimental effects on post-war nation-building 
efforts. 
 President Bush’s vision for the restoration of governing forces consisted of three phases: 
first, he planned the establishment of a transitional government by the end of May, 2003, that 
would have “power over ‘non-sensitive’ government ministries such as education and health 
care.”287 This transitional government would be succeeded by a provisional government between 
six months and two years after the interim authority was established; this government would 
have “greater powers than its predecessor and be tasked with writing a constitution.”288 Finally, 
this transitional stage would culminate in formal, national elections for permanent government 
positions. Within weeks of the American seizure of Baghdad, a myriad of fledgling political 
groups, independent candidates, and tribal leaders came forward, each with their own blueprints 
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for a new and improved Iraq.289 Some sources estimate that roughly 100 political parties 
emerged during the initial weeks and months of liberation, six of which formed the crux of the 
Iraqi political arena:290  
Political Party Name Affiliation 
Iraqi National Congress (INC) Shi’a exile group 
Iraqi National Accord (INA) Shi’a exile group 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Kurdish organization 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Kurdish organization 
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Shi’a organization 
Da’wa Shi’a organization 
 
Table 3: The six major political organizations that emerged following the fall of Saddam Hussein.  
 
 While political parties formed, British and American forces decided they would officially 
spearhead the political transformation effort before handing the reins to an Iraqi interim 
authority. In early April, 2003, the Bush administration announced plans to hold a series of 
summits with potential Iraqi leaders to deliberate over plans for a democratic, representative 
government.291 On April 15th, a thirteen-point memorandum was produced from one of these 
summits, outlining the stipulations for a new Iraq; point seven was particularly paramount, and 
asserted that “Iraqis must choose their leaders [and] not have them imposed from the outside.”292 
Despite the ostensible success of these meetings, a growing point of contention arose in the 
inclusion of Iraqi exiles, backed by the United States, in the political plans, in contrast to the 
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exclusion of leaders from Saddam’s administration who remained in Iraq.293 These tensions 
intensified over the coming months, particularly during the reign of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). 
Between May of 2003 and June of 2004, the CPA, headed by American Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer III, attempted to restore order before handing power over to Iraqi candidates. In 
CPA Orders Number 1 and Number 2, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi armed forces and later purged 
a high volume of Ba’athists from the ravaged government.294 Although originally deemed a 
necessary measure to maintain security and prevent the reorganization of opposition forces loyal 
to Saddam Hussein, the disintegration of the armed forces and civil services had two lasting, 
destructive effects: first, roughly 250,000 civil servants and members of the armed forces were 
left unemployed, creating a shortage of qualified officials to provide valuable guidance 
throughout the reconstruction era. Second, the dissolution of these positions triggered a wave of 
discontent, fueling both the insurgency and sweeping anti-American sentiment.  
In July of 2003, Bremer announced the selection of an Iraqi interim authority, the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), which consisted of the six major political organizations referenced in 
Table 3, in addition to minor parties and independent candidates.295 The IGC lacked any official 
governing powers at the time, merely acting as the Iraqi face of American authority. It consisted 
of twenty-five members and was explicitly sectarian: it possessed thirteen Shi’a representatives, 
five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkman and one Assyrian.296 Of these twenty-five members, 
sixteen either came from outside the country or from the north, resulting in both a lack of 
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recognition and trust from the general Iraqi public.297 Additionally and perhaps most notably, 
Sunni Arabs were hit hardest during this time, first from Bremer’s orders to disband civil 
servants and armed forces, and second from their exclusion from the political process.  
The stark contrast between their treatment in the former regime—which consisted of 
promotions to prominent positions within the government and the allocation of resources and 
wealth—and their post-war disenfranchisement radicalized many Sunnis. In fact, Sunni 
insurgents challenged the legitimacy of the IGC almost immediately, accusing the assembly of 
collaborating too closely with the United States.298 A wave of violence aimed at the IGC and 
other politicians involved in the creation and promotion of Iraqi democracy resulted in the deaths 
of high-profile figures.299 Sunni Arabs, who held power throughout most of the 20th century, 
feared majority tyranny over minority groups like themselves: “Not surprisingly, minorities often 
fight democratization because they fear that majority rule would install in power a permanent 
elected majority that would never allow the minority a voice in decision-making.”300 
By November of 2003, the Iraqi public had become increasingly frustrated with the lack 
of progress with regard to an elected government and security improvements. Most of this 
frustration was directed toward the CPA, U.S. officials and Bremer himself. According to a 
leaked CIA document dated November 10th, Iraqi citizens were losing faith generally in the 
U.S., and this lack of confidence was materializing in the form of an armed insurgency.301 In 
December of 2003, Sunni Arabs organized their own political party, titled the State Council for 
the Sunnis, which united three subdivisions: the Sufis, the Salafis, and the left-leaning Muslim 
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Brotherhood.302 Together, they demanded political representation in the new Iraq. Other Sunnis 
banded together, particularly across the “Sunni Triangle”—which includes Fallujah, Tikrit, 
Ramadi and Samara—calling for “jihad against the United States and for Arab Sunnis to rise up 
and overthrow their occupiers. Throughout CPA’s tenure, an increasingly well-organized 
insurgency against coalition forces grew in the Sunni Triangle.”303 
By the spring of 2004, the United States began conducting large-scale counterinsurgency 
operations against Sunni Arab insurgents in Fallujah and an emergent Shi’a militia led by 
nationalist Muqtada al-Sadr.304 Because coalition forces had not anticipated the necessity of 
resuming military operations, they lacked “a clear overall COIN strategy…[and] coalition forces 
focused on tactical matters, executing door-to-door raids mixed with presence patrols in Baghdad 
and other cities; both approaches proved increasingly intermittent and ineffective over time.”305 
During April and May of 2004 in particular, U.S. forces in Iraq felt compelled to divert resources 
and energy away from reconstruction efforts in order to combat the growing, multi-faceted 
insurgency and sectarian violence. Insurgents in the “Sunni Triangle” found U.S. forces’ limited 
tactical intelligence, their lack of familiarity with the region and an inadequate 
counterinsurgency strategy particularly easy to exploit; by the summer of 2004, Sunni insurgents 
began targeting main supply routes, often detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which 
not only killed coalition forces, but restricted the flow of supplies to areas in need of aid.306 
 One of the primary grievances of Sunni Arabs was the over-presence of Americans in the 
new political process. In an attempt to quell the rising insurgency, American officials sought to 
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transfer power to the Iraqis as soon as possible. Various setbacks hindered this process, 
particularly with regard to drafting the constitution; many Iraqis and coalition leaders alike 
grappled with issues like religion in politics, the reconciliation of Iraqi exiles with Iraqi locals 
and former members of the regime, the question of enhancing security, and the reduction the role 
of the United States in the political realm.307 On March 1, 2004, the IGC agreed to a Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL), which enshrined individual rights, incorporated Islam, designated 
twenty-five percent of parliament’s seats for women, and conditioned that elections for a 275-
member assembly would be held in January of 2005.308 Iraqis were largely angered at the 
prospect of waiting almost another year for elections, sparking fears that the United States would 
never leave. However, the main rationale behind delaying elections was the “poor security 
environment” that had the potential to endanger the success of elections: 
“The UN envoy argued that elections would not be feasible if security could not be 
ensured at voting stations. Thus, continued violence helped to delay one of the key 
demands of most Iraqis—to select their leaders through popular votes. The failure of 
coalition forces to improve the security environment adversely affected the safety and 
productivity of the Iraqi Interim Government. It also damaged Iraqi perceptions of the 
occupying powers’ motives and intentions toward the country.”309 
 
While many cited this weakness in the security sector as potentially catastrophic, the Bush 
administration decided that postponing elections would fuel the insurgent cause, and proceeded 
to make extensive arrangements for the first official electoral processes. During the months of 
preparation, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi proclaimed his allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden. Their respective terrorist organizations merged, and al-Zarqawi officially launched al 
Qaeda in Iraq, which began orchestrating and managing small, decentralized cells. 
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Retrospectively, glaring holes in Iraq’s security sector, including a lack of organizational and 
detection capabilities, easily facilitated the group’s pervasion. By the time January’s elections 
came around, AQI had already established strong footholds across major cities and rural areas. 
January 2005 Elections 
 On January 30th, 2005, more than 8.5 million of 14.7 million registered voters flocked to 
the polls to vote on a 275-seat transitional National Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of 
Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and for a Kurdistan regional assembly. These preliminary elections 
represented the first steps of a year-long process to institute a new government, ratify and agree 
upon an official constitution, and hold elections for a constitutional government.310 More than 
8.5 million of 14.7 (fifty-three percent) registered voters cast their ballots according to the 
proportional representation, or closed list, electoral system, in which voters chose among 
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Political Party Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage of Votes 
United Iraqi Alliance  140 4,075,295 48.19 
Kurdish Alliance 75 2,175,551 25.73 
Iraqi List of Iyad Allawi 40 1,168,943 13.82 
Iraqis 5 150,680 1.78 
Turkomen Iraqi Front 3 93,480 1.11 
National Independent Elites and Cadres Party 3 69,938 0.83 
Communist Party 2 69,920 0.83 
Islamic Kurdish Society 2 60,592 0.72 
Islamic Labor Movement in Iraq 2 43,205 0.51 
National Democratic Alliance  1 36,795 0.44 
National Rafidain List 1 36,255 0.43 
Reconciliation and Liberation Entity 1 30,796 0.36 
 
Table 4: Electoral results from the January 30th, 2005 Transitional National Assembly elections.311 
 
Notably, the top three groups, comprising only Shi’a Arabs and Kurds, occupied 255 seats. Sunni 
Arabs, who represented roughly twenty percent of the total population, held only seventeen seats, 
or roughly six percent of total seats.312 The conspicuous absence of Sunnis can, in part, be 
attributed to their boycott of the elections, organized in November of 2004 by an influential 
Sunni clerics’ group, the Association of Muslim Scholars.313 This, coupled with the fact that 
“insurgents repeatedly targeted polling stations and threatened to kill anyone who voted,” 
resulted in low Sunni voter turnout.314 According to an opinion poll conducted in early January 
of 2005, only nine percent of Sunnis said they were likely to or would definitely vote, whereas 
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eighty and fifty-seven percent of Shi’as and Kurds intended to vote.315 On election day, sixteen 
insurgent-directed attacks were recorded across Iraq, killing at least twenty-five people.316 
Generally, the lack of Sunni representation and the over-representation of other groups, like the 
Kurds, sowed the seeds for greater discontent and fueled the insurgency throughout the 
subsequent months: 
“Whether through principled opposition to foreign occupation, fear of insurgent reprisals, 
or unwillingness to participate in a losing venture, the vast majority of Sunni Arabs opted 
not to exercise their democratic right to vote. The marginalization of Sunni Arabs from 
the political process (self-imposed or otherwise) and the virtual exclusion of their 
representatives from the National Assembly [created] a serious problem for future 
political stability.”317 
 
The first duty of the elected Assembly was appointing an interim President; they selected Jalal 
Talabani, a Kurd. The second duty of the elected Assembly was the drafting and ratification of a 
constitution. On May 10, 2005, a fifty-five member drafting committee was appointed, although 
only two of these members were Sunni Arabs.318 Many provisions outlined in the new 
constitution received widespread backlash, such as the stipulation permitting two or more 
provinces together to form new autonomous regions, each with their own independent, internal 
security forces (Article 117).319 Sunnis registered in large numbers in an attempt to defeat the 
constitution, although they ultimately failed in procuring the two-thirds veto majority necessary 
per province.320 These developments—the lack of representation in the interim National 
Assembly and stipulations laid out in the constitution that clashed with Sunni interests—had two 
profound, yet conflicting, effects: first, Sunni under-representation and marginalization fueled 
the insurgency and a  “violent opposition to the new Iraqi political order,” and second, it 
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“communicated the message to many Sunnis that their withdrawal from the political process – 
and the boycott of the January 2005 elections in particular – did not stop the consolidation of the 
new Iraqi political order as many seemed to hope it would.”321 This combination contributed to 
the enhanced participation of broad sections of the Sunni community in the December 2005 
parliamentary elections. 
December 2005 Elections 
 On December 15th, 2005, registered voters cast their ballots in a closed-list electoral 
system for the first full term 275-member Council of Representatives. Forty-five seats (roughly 
sixteen percent) were designated compensatory or national seats, or seats allocated among parties 
who won seats on the provincial level according to the number of votes they received overall.322  
This election was crucial in three primary ways: first, it equipped Iraq with its first full-fledged 
legislature since the invasion, representative of the changeover of power from American-led 
coalition forces to the Iraqi people. Second, the 275 legislators were to serve a four-year term, 
choose a lasting government, and tackle unresolved issues in the constitution. Lastly, it would 
begin to facilitate the withdrawal process of the United States.323 Of the roughly 15.5 million 
registered voters, 12.1 million cast votes (seventy-eight percent) across eighteen electoral 
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Political Party Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage of Votes 
United Iraqi Alliance 128 5,021,137 41.19 
Kurdistan Alliance 53 2,642,172 21.67 
Iraqi Accord Front 44 1,840,216 15.09 
Iraqi National List 25 977,325 8.02 
Iraqi National Dialogue 11 499,963 4.10 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan 5 157,688 1.29 
Progressives 2 145,028 1.19 
Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc 3 129,847 1.07 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 1 87,993 0.72 
Al Rafidain List 1 47,263 0.39 
Mithal Al-Alousi List For Iraqi Nation 1 32,245 0.26 
Al-Ezediah Movement  1 21,908 0.18 
 
Table 5: Electoral results from the December 15th, 2005 Council of Representatives elections.324 
 
 The polls largely reflected the sectarian division of votes. The Shi’a dominated United 
Iraqi Alliance held onto its lead, comprising roughly forty-five percent of the total seats; next, 
the Kurdistan Alliance remained steadfast, holding on to roughly twenty percent of seats; lastly, 
the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Accord Front and the Iraqi National List trailed behind.325 Although 
this election was promising in that it reflected the interests of at least part of the Sunni 
population, it also “showed increasing sectarian politics in Iraq. There was no candidate or 
political party with a definite political philosophy or political agenda, just religious and ethnic 
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entities. The electoral campaign also fanned sectarianism rather than [contributed] to national 
unity and liberation.”326 
 While relatively few attacks were carried out by insurgents during election day, the 
December 2005 elections had profound effects on the proliferation and transformation of the 
insurgent cause. On one hand, specific factions of the insurgency disappeared as many Sunni 
clerics in hotbeds like Anbar and Fallujah instructed their congregations to vote in order to 
facilitate greater representation in the government.327 On the other, emerging groups like AQI 
terrorized politicians and voters alike with death threats.328 The group, thought to be financed by 
supporting factions in Saudi Arabia and neighboring Syria, mushroomed significantly in the 
subsequent months. 
The general tone of the insurgency also underwent a transformation: before the elections, 
roughly eighty percent of attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated areas in central Iraq against 
coalition forces, whereas predominantly Kurdish and Shi’a cities and regions remained relatively 
peaceful.329 Former members of Saddam’s regime comprised “the core of the insurgency.”330 
However, after the December 2005 elections, Islamic fundamentalists, exploiting Iraq’s security 
vacuum and the lack of centralized control, joined the cause, ushering in heightened anti-
American and anti-secular rhetoric. In particular, “the election results cemented ethnic and 
sectarian divisions within Iraqi society...Coalition forces and foreign personnel [were] not the 
primary targets; instead, the events of targeting religious figures and indiscriminate killings on 
the occasion of religious gatherings [became] a common phenomenon.”331 
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In April of 2006, the Parliament officially elected incumbent President Jalal Talabani for 
a four-year term.332 Talabani appointed Nouri Jawad al-Maliki, a Shi’a member of Parliament 
(MP), to preside over the new government as Prime Minister, and he took office in May of 
2006.333 In a balancing act, Parliament also elected Mahmoud Dawud al-Mashhadani, a Sunni 
Arab, as Speaker of the Parliament.334 The government’s new cabinet also reflected equalizing 
efforts to incorporate members pertaining to each major sect: in the distribution of ministerial 
posts, twenty-one went to Shi’a Arabs, eight to Sunni Arabs, seven to Kurds, and one to a 
Christian.335 These attempts, although ostensibly unifying, seem to have underlying divisive 
effects:  
“Most groups joining the government are still likely to view the ministries they have been 
allocated as vehicles for patronage. The main Shi’a alliance retains the Oil Ministry. 
They will also control most of the ‘service ministries,’ including health, education, 
transport and promote themselves as the main benefactor. The Kurds not only hold the 
Presidency, they also keep the Foreign Ministry. Here it is interesting to note that while 
Shia and Sunni Arabs remained arguing bitterly over the shape and control of Iraq, the 
Kurds were steadily entrenching their autonomy in the north.”336 
 
The following months saw greater and greater levels of mistrust between members of the new 
government, increasingly sect-based politics, and rising levels of violence as foreign terrorists 
continued to permeate the weak fabric of Iraqi society. In the spring of 2006, foreign extremists 
destroyed the golden dome of the Ali al-Hadi Mosque, sixty miles north of Baghdad.337 Two 
tombs in the mosque were greatly revered by Shi’as, and their destruction provoked retaliatory 
attacks against Sunni mosques in Baghdad and Basra. Shi’a Ayatollah al-Sistani released a 
statement saying: “If the government’s security forces cannot provide the necessary protection, 
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the believers will do it.”338 On August 3, 2006, the U.S. Central Command commander, General 
John Abizaid, said in congressional testimony: “I believe that the sectarian violence is probably 
as bad as I’ve seen it in Baghdad in particular, and that, if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq 
could move towards civil war.”339  
Meanwhile, AQI transformed into ISIS. On October 15th, 2005, members of the 
leadership announced the formation of an Islamic State comprising the provinces of al Anbar, 
Kirkuk, SalahadDin, Diyala, and portions of Babel and Wasit.340 The inception of ISIS only 
augmented sectarian violence, and seemed to cement sect-centric politics as well: 
“[ISIS] claimed to be [forming] in response to Kurds and Shi’a Arabs securing semi-
autonomous regions within Iraq. Islamic extremists continued attacking Shi’a Arabs, 
whom they portrayed as apostates in league with foreign occupiers. By early 2006, 
sectarian violence was escalating in areas where Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs were mixed, 
especially the Baghdad area. In some neighborhoods, Iraqis relied on militias and less-
formal organizations for security; however, these were increasingly outlawed by U.S. and 
Iraqi security forces. In several areas, Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs began to relocate along 
sectarian lines, amid violence reminiscent of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the 
Balkans, especially Bosnia.”341 
 
Throughout 2006, U.S. officials estimated that Shi’a militias killed more people than Sunni 
insurgents; they represented a particular issue as the militias were “represented politically within 
the government, and they infiltrated Iraqi police forces.”342 As sectarian strife reached all-time 
highs, Prime Minister al-Maliki composed a national reconciliation plan aimed at “defusing the 
insurgency and tackling the sectarian violence.”343  
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By August of 2006, top Iraqi politicians and coalition forces consolidated a series of 
benchmarks in an effort to achieve political reconciliation.344 In addition to providing financial 
aid, the United States sent roughly 30,000 additional forces to Iraq in early 2007 in what became 
known as “the surge.” It was “intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of 
growing Sunni Arab rejection of extremist groups. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement 
of many of the major legislative benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that was 
attributed to surge—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was 
advancing.”345 However, coalition forces advocated for the continued entrenchment of adopted 
laws, institutions, norms, and compromises among ethno-religious factions in order to fully 
quash the insurgency. Throughout 2008 and 2009, Maliki’s growing strength and authority over 
the nation increased levels of optimism, although it became clear that the 2010 elections would 
represent the ultimate test. 
March 2010 Elections 
 The March 2010 elections represented the final probe into Iraq’s stability, the last 
stepping stone in coalition efforts to build democracy before the withdrawal of American forces: 
“The short and fierce political campaign could end up either solidifying Iraq’s nascent 
democracy or leaving the country fractured along ethnic and sectarian lines.”346 Shi’as, Sunnis 
and Kurds alike turned out in full force to vote for a 325-member Parliament, which possessed 
seven national seats and eight seats reserved for religious minorities.347 The Parliament would 
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choose the full-term government, with the majority exercising significant power to select a prime 
minister.  
According to a New York Times article, the elections were “arguably the most open, 
most competitive election in the nation’s long history of colonial rule, dictatorship and war.”348 
Despite this ringing endorsement, insurgents still managed to inflict serious damage. On March 
3rd, just days before the elections, a series of suicide bombings north of Baghdad killed over 
thirty-two people and injured more than forty.349 While Iraqi politicians and American forces 
touted the progress made across the security sector since 2005, analysts continued to point out 
that “forces wishing to disrupt the political process have shown that they are still capable of 
mounting serious attacks.”350 Additionally, legislation passed regarding candidate eligibility 
angered many Sunnis, as the Justice and Accountability Commission invalidated the candidacies 
of almost 500 contenders, most of which were Sunni Arabs and possessed ties to Saddam’s 
regime.   
When the polls closed at the end of the day on March 7th, 2010, party leaders announced 
that two coalitions performed best: first, the Iraqi List led by Ayad Allawi, who promised to take 
steps to reconcile sectarian divisions, and second, the State of the Law coalition led by Prime 
Minister al-Maliki, who campaigned on enhanced security.351 Neither coalition secured an 
outright majority, which resulted in ambiguity surrounding al-Maliki’s potential second term as 
Prime Minister. The following table depicts the results from the parliamentary elections: 
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Political Party Number of Seats Number of Votes Percentage of Votes 
Iraqi List of Ayad Allawi 91 2,849,612 24.72 
State of the Law List 89 2,792,083 24.22 
Iraqi National Alliance 70 2,092,066 18.15 
Kurdistan Alliance 43 1,681,714 14.59 
Iraqi Consensus Front 8 476,478 4.13 
The Unity of Iraq Coalition 4 306,647 2.66 
The Changing List 6 298,226 2.59 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan 4 243,720 2.12 
Kurdistan Islamic Group 2 152,530 1.32 
Minorities 8 61,153 - 
 
Table 6: Electoral results from the March 7th, 2010 Parliamentary elections.352 
 
Allawi’s faction, which held the greatest number of seats, jeopardized al-Maliki’s chances to 
extend his premiership to a second term. On April 19th, a panel of Iraqi judges ordered the 
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to conduct a recount in Baghdad after alleged 
evidence demonstrating irregularities in the Baghdad count surfaced.353 Several international 
observers rendered the recount invalid, as there was little substantiation pointing to electoral 
fraud.354  Ultimately, the recount did not result in an alteration of seat-party allocations.  
The widely sectarian and faction-centric parliament, however, did create issues of its 
own. The newly-elected Council of Representatives met on June 15th, 2010 to select a leadership 
team. The forum lasted eighteen minutes; because of political deadlock, Parliament did not elect 
a leadership team and remained inactive for many months.355 With the U.S. combat mission 
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nearing completion, the United States intervened once again in mediating the hotly contested 
political standstill. Finally, on October 1st, al-Maliki received the necessary support from the 
Council of Representatives deputies, bringing him within range of obtaining another term.356  
On February 1st, 2011, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador to 
Iraq Jim Jeffries testified that the new Iraqi government represented a triumph for U.S. foreign 
policy in that centered heavily on power-sharing.357 However, ethno-sectarian divisions continue 
to persist, often manifesting themselves in violent outbreaks and mass protests. The Iraqi security 
forces, largely inadequate to handle the ramp up of ISIS as it grew and conquered vast swaths of 
territory from 2011 to 2016, lacked authority and the resources necessary to keep the order.  
Violence and instability in neighboring countries, including Syria and Iran, has also 
compromised the security of Iraqi civilians across the country.  
Conclusions 
 In summary, the invasion in March of 2003, the demise of Saddam Hussein’s half-
century-long totalitarian reign, and the collapse of most bureaucratic organizations produced 
considerable socio-political changes. The coercive apparatus crumbled, high-ranking individuals 
connected to the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath party were deposed and stripped of power, and power 
relations reversed, with Shi’a Arabs and Kurds finally exercising control in the political arena. 
However, the establishment of new political parties, governing systems, and a constitution could 
not compensate for the general destruction of law and order, which created not only a security 
vacuum, but a breeding ground for terrorist groups and insurgencies. Sunni Arabs in particular 
have largely backed multiple insurgencies and have resisted the new Iraqi order, which 
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represented a fall from the privileged positions they enjoyed during Saddam’s rule. In response, 
violent Shi’a militias have emerged to combat Sunni organizations, many of which have been 
able to penetrate the political arena and Iraqi security forces, which has led to widespread 
corruption. AQI and ISIS have taken advantage of the absence of a centralized, capable security 
force in order to execute their own agendas, bringing with them widespread destruction and the 
necessity for individuals to take security into their own hands. 
From these seeds of unrest, instability and sect-centric divisions, we can discern three 
primary lessons relating to Iraq’s regression into near anarchy. First, exclusionary politics, 
exhibited by the under-representation and omission of former elites in electoral processes, played 
a significant role in the escalation of violence. Second, as demonstrated by the literature 
propounding a correlation between democratization and violence, Iraq backslid into anarchy 
because necessary institutions pertaining particularly to security and the coercive apparatus did 
not take precedence in post-war rebuilding processes. Third, American forces of Iraq sparked 
nationalistic backlash against occupation, which increased when it became clear that the U.S. 
intended to install a pro-American, pro-western leader.  
I. Exclusionary Politics 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, British colonialists first drew illogical borders, 
encompassing a number of ethno-religious groups with little in common, and then installed 
Sunni Arabs as proxy leaders following World War I. The lack of social cohesion, shared values, 
and equal representation set the stage for a tumultuous transition of power:  
“...the congruence – or at least the compatibility – between territorial borders with 
patterns of social cohesion and legitimacy is essential for successful state-building. But 
state-building is a non-linear process in permanent motion on a continuum between 
fragile/weak and strong state images and practices. These rely not just on territorial 
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control but also on financial resources as well as the establishment of a minimum of 
social cohesion and legitimacy.”358  
 
Following the Ba’ath party’s consolidation of power, Saddam Hussein largely filled high-ranking 
positions within his government with Sunni Arabs. While Shi’a Arabs represented the majority 
in the country, Saddam’s “repressive ways were credited with keeping the fractious population of 
26 million—including 20 percent Sunni Muslims, who dominated; 55 percent Shiite Muslims; 20 
percent Kurds plus several tiny minorities including Christians—from shattering along ethnic 
lines.”359 Thus, for roughly eighty years, Shi’a Arabs were marginalized and excluded from 
politics, although unable to successfully challenge the existing power structure due to Saddam’s 
highly capable and violent coercive apparatus.  
The invasion of 2003 “marked the empowerment of sect-centric political actors and the 
political institutionalization of Iraq’s sectarian and other communal divides; in Arab Iraq, it 
marked the beginning of the contest between Shi’a-centric state building and Sunni rejection.”360 
The exclusion and widespread boycott of Sunni Arabs in early electoral processes possessed 
enduring effects on the ensuing insurgency and rampant use of violence for two primary reasons. 
First, as demonstrated in the El Salvador case, the inclusion of all factions in post-war politics is 
essential to maintaining the peace, as actors feel they have the opportunity to address the 
grievances of members of the population. Second, by excluding Sunni Arabs, the CPA and 
interim authorities not only neglected a significant portion of the population, but they also 
marginalized former elites who had the power, resources, and long-standing military operational 
experience to contest the new-found political order.  
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New studies assert that “whether a post-war state emerges as democratic or not depends 
to a large extent on the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders.”361 For 
Sunni Arabs, this bargaining process was essentially non-existent. When examining the 
ramifications, it is first important to note that domestic elites indispensable to the post-war 
rebuilding process do not come exclusively from the political arena.362 Instead, elites spanning 
all functional aspects of society play a significant role in reconstruction:    
“Economic elites play an enormous role in transition, generating and providing the 
financial resources necessary for (post-conflict) democratisation, while security elites 
control the security forces (both regular forces, such as the military and the police, and 
irregular forces, such as criminal networks and rebel groups) and can therefore easily 
return a post-conflict country to a state of turmoil. Another important role of elites is to 
interpret and define social reality and thereby influence public opinion and the 
preference-formation of large parts of the society. Accordingly, civil society elites (that 
is, leaders of civil society organisations, popular writers, artists and intellectuals, but also 
religious elites and elders) can also play such a role, challenging incumbent political 
elites through their activities.”363 
 
Consensus between elites, peace-builders and new political forces is essential to achieving 
peaceful democratization, institutional reform, and norm-building. In particular, domestic elites’ 
stamps of approval may provide the stability necessary for a peaceful transition: “Elite consensus 
is an expression of commitment to the democratic rules of the game. Once the political elites 
abide by those rules, the electorate is likely to accept democracy as a legitimate political 
system.”364 Furthermore, the establishment of these rules and norms from the beginning is 
preeminent in discouraging the use of violence. As demonstrated above, the decisive exclusion 
of domestic elites from the post-war reconstruction process forced many Sunnis to resort to 
resistance via violent tactics. 
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The two predominant catalysts for resistance were the disbandment of Iraqi armed forces 
and de-Ba’athification, which had profound effects on Sunni Arabs. As mentioned above, the 
dissolution of the army and military not only created a security gap, but also left hundreds of 
thousands of men unemployed, embittered and fundamentally opposed to American occupation 
and Shi’a political dominance. De-Ba’athification, which was originally justifiable due to 
security concerns and Shi’a complaints of extensive suffering at the hands of the party, had a 
similar effect, stripping former elites of their power. After the January 2005 elections, one Sunni 
religious leader reportedly stated: “They have destroyed our institutions, our people and our 
security. They have totally erased us.”365 Feeling sidelined and deprived of their former status, 
many Sunni Arabs felt they had no choice but to support the nascent insurgency, which 
originally targeted the “occupiers” but later victimized Shi’as.366   
It was not until six months after coalition forces toppled Saddam’s regime that Sunni 
Arabs successfully organized their own political party.367 Exiled Shi’as and Kurds, who began 
organizing their own political factions long before the invasion, possessed a distinct advantage in 
electoral processes, particularly as they had the time, resources, and American sponsorship to 
campaign effectively. Shi’as in particular championed the reversal of the political order: 
“Politically, the fact that identity politics and Shi’a-centric state building resonated with a 
significant body of Shi’a opinion was reflected in the electoral process. For a certain 
constituency, regime change provided a unique opportunity through which to guarantee 
the empowerment of Shi’a political actors, thereby validating their sense of entitlement, 
their sense of victimhood, and their demographic weight. This partly explains the 
sweeping success of the UIA—the grand Shi’a electoral coalition—in the December 
2005 election.”368 
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Electoral processes particularly represent the solidification and validity of a new social and 
political order, which is partly why we see significant upsurges in violence on or just before 
election days. In this case, electoral processes decreased the state of security, as insurgents and 
former elites attempted to outwardly reject and disrupt the most fundamental element of 
democracy: 
“Some argue that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the new-found 
subordination of the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two 
subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shi’a militia factions to counter 
the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of 
2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing.”369 
 
Sect-centric and exclusionary politics paved the way for what many denominate now as “the 
wars of all against all,” or the internal strife between Coalition forces and Sunni insurgents, 
foreign terrorist groups, and Shi’a based militia members; Sunni Arabs against Shi’a Arabs; and 
terrorist organizations against Shi’as, Kurds and foreign workers.370 Generally, political theorists 
agree that a transfer of power from one faction to another tends to generate conflict.371 This 
transferal extended beyond politicians, including the general public as well, as Shi’as and Kurds 
rose in status above newly-marginalized Sunnis. Violence took on an increasingly multi-faceted 
nature, resulting in extreme difficulty in coordinating a centralized, effective response:  
“The insurgents’ success had both political and military effects. The growing insurgency 
prevented the Iraqi government from exerting its writ of control across Iraq. The 
relationship between insurgent groups remains to this day a complex milieu of Sunni 
Arab insurgents, Shi’a militia, criminal gangs, foreigners, and other opportunists who 
conduct business at a transactional level—which is why U.S. efforts to split or wedge 
these groups and their leaders from one another have proven so difficult.”372 
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Zarqawi and subsequent ISIS leaders, taking advantage of existing sectarian schisms, “set a 
strategic goal of making Iraq ungovernable by unleashing a wave of sectarian killings designed 
to foment civil war between Sunni and Shi’a.”373 In his teachings, Zarqawi declared that there 
could be no “‘total victory’ over the Jews and Christians without a ‘total annihilation’ of the 
Shi’a, whom he called the secret agents of Islam’s enemies.”374  
 At the root of the virulent insurgency, the ensuing emergence of faction-based militias, 
and the pervasion of terrorist organizations is Iraq’s inability to effectively manage communal 
pluralism.375 Many of these challenges stem from the arbitrary borders British imperialists drew 
up following World War I, which created states without a common identity or sense of unity. 
Since power-sharing was non-existent during Saddam’s reign, incorporating voices from all 
ethno-religious groups has been an unfamiliar, difficult process. However, had the CPA and 
interim authorities adopted greater measures to encourage the inclusion of Sunnis and, more 
specifically, former elites in the post-war rebuilding process, incentives for the use of violence 
may have decreased. Instead, the unchecked use of violence, force and destabilizing forces was 
enabled by the absence of an operative, effective coercive apparatus.  
II. Institutional Deficiencies 
 As discussed earlier in the chapter, the discrepancies between pre-war planning and post-
war actualities resulted in a lack of strong, functioning bureaucratic institutions. As propounded 
by Mansfield and Snyder, institutions enhance the legitimacy and stability of the state, abate 
domestic political competition, and strengthen security.376 Additionally, particularly for nations 
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lacking unity, institutions contribute in “knitting” together a common identity and shared sense 
of values.377  
 In post-2003 assessments on the current state of affairs, many American military and 
political personnel noted the “top-down paralysis” of governing institutions, placing particular 
emphasis on the decay of law and order structures. Commander of the U.S. Army’s 5th Corps 
Lieutenant-General William Wallace stated: “What in fact happened, which was unanticipated at 
least in [my mind], is that when [we] decapitated the regime, everything below it fell apart.”378 
With regard to security, pre-war planners had envisaged that Iraqi armed forces would undergo a 
process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), while continuing to provide 
the necessary security to oversee a peaceful transitional period. The post-war reality, however, 
was drastically different: “The Iraqi security sector...disappeared—army conscripts deserted, 
army officers and police personnel left their posts, and members of the security services went 
underground. Where they did not voluntarily disappear, local police officers were often removed 
either by the advancing coalition forces or by anti-regime militias.”379 
 The collapse of the security sector was largely emblematic of the “paralysis” of all 
bureaucratic institutions that existed in the pre-invasion era.380 Saddam’s highly-centralized, 
hierarchical chain of command did not permit the transferal of power and authority from one 
civil servant to the next; when one fell, the rest did, too. As a result, coalition forces wasted 
precious time and energy starting from square one, often building institutions from scratch. The 
deficiencies with regard to the coercive apparatus and security were particularly devastating: 
“Beginning with rampant looting and violence throughout the country following the fall 
of Baghdad on April 9, coalition forces lost time and the trust of the population by failing 
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to control the security environment. The looting caused substantial damage to the 
government’s infrastructure—including the destruction of most federal buildings and 
police stations, and many museums, schools, and hospitals—which, in turn, required 
coalition authorities to rebuild many of these institutions from the ground up, thus 
delaying political development. Furthermore, rampant unchecked looting made the 
population question coalition forces’ capabilities and intentions in invading and 
occupying the country, including coalition plans to create a new Iraqi government.”381 
 
As referenced in the section on exclusionary politics, the U.S. failure to protect the Iraqi 
population played an extraordinary role in the emergence of the insurgency and ethno-sectarian 
violence. Civilians in particular were forced to take security matters into their own hands: “In the 
security vacuum that ensued, Iraqi citizens were forced to engage in a Faustian bargain—often 
looking to bad actors for protection—in order to survive.”382  
 The consolidation of ISIS has been cited as one of the more prominent manifestations of 
security sector deficiencies in Iraq. As the terrorist organization controlled roughly forty percent 
of Iraq’s territory at its peak in 2014, it wreaked havoc on other institutions and bureaucratic 
processes, jeopardizing Iraq’s fragile democracy:383 “Terrorism impeded reconstruction in 
several ways. It drove most of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) out of Iraq, prompted donor countries to reconsider making contributions, discouraged 
private companies from investing, [and] compelled the United States to divert funds toward 
security.”384 Thus, while the Iraq case demonstrates the importance of constructing institutions 
generally before holding elections or establishing any form of government, it highlights the 
primacy of establishing an effective, just and strong security sector.  
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III. Nationalist and Jihadist Backlash 
The eight-year American occupation of Iraq received two, dichotomous responses: the 
dominant came from Iraqi nationalists and Americans alike, both of whom advocated for the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces for different reasons. Social scientists have largely concluded that 
foreign occupation elicits a type of nationalist awareness, culminating in the “desire for 
liberation.”385 The assumption of authority by an intervening power, one that has been widely 
perceived as an imperialist, colonialist, self-serving entity, did not sit well with many Iraqis, 
particularly Sunnis. This discontent had broader effects: (1) political candidates associated with 
the U.S. were perceived as traitors, thus inhibiting electoral processes; (2) terrorist organizations 
like AQI and ISIS exploited anti-American sentiment in their recruiting efforts and use of 
violence; (3) the reconstruction process, which was largely driven by the U.S., lacked a coherent 
understanding of Iraq’s culture and distinct ethno-religious history, much of which has 
compromised security today. 
The other response, however, was rooted in the idea that if democracy were to survive 
and flourish in Iraq, it would require significant resources, aid and personnel from the U.S. and 
other intervening forces. Many asserted that organizing elections will not transform Iraq into a 
democracy. Rather,  
“Iraq’s transition to a truly healthy functioning democracy will require educating the 
population, both formally and informally, to accept democratic values, norms, and 
institutions and encouraging the growth of civil associations, which could take a decade 
or longer to foster. Iraq cannot establish these values and institutions alone. The task may 
require a sustained commitment from the United States, its partners, and the international 
community, if Iraq is to become a stable and lasting democracy.”386  
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Additionally, others argued that early American withdrawal would make Iraq vulnerable to the 
self-serving agendas of neighboring countries like Iran, Turkey or Syria.387 Further, they contend 
that many of the barriers to democracy relate to security, which the U.S. would be able to 
provide by deploying a large number of forces to Iraq: “In particular, intervening powers can 
help quell internal unrest and deter adventurism from neighboring powers.388  Regardless of 
these responses, extended American occupation in Iraq had detrimental effects on the 
reconstruction era, particularly because the U.S. failed to capitalize on their powers as an 
intervening force, was unsuccessful in providing security for the populace, and wrongly 
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Chapter IV: Conclusions 
 As the United States has faced greater difficulties in maintaining hard fought foreign 
policy victories in the past half-century, adhering to the three strands of Just War Theory has 
become progressively more decisive. The most under-examined element in the tripartite theory, 
jus post bellum, has gained greater recognition in recent years as political scientists acknowledge 
its lasting effects on post-war peace. Accordingly, I found that security is a necessary 
prerequisite for stability in the post-war era; as such, I argue that jus post bellum is less about 
providing justice in the immediate aftermath of war, and more about establishing a foundation 
upon which to reconstruct a stable bureaucratic system equipped to execute its basic functions. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, I have aligned with the basic premises of population-centric 
warfare, which propounds the necessity of incorporating the domestic populace into the 
reconstruction process and winning over their hearts and minds. Without security, the populace 
remains incapacitated, unable to properly partake in electoral processes, and at risk of turning to 
insurgent forces for protection.  
For the purposes of this study, the evolution of security in the post bellum era serves as a 
microcosmic indicator of national stability and transitional peace, both of which relate directly to 
waging and concluding a “just” war. While security sector institutions and programs can lay the 
groundwork for institutional and bureaucratic strength, we cannot conclusively draw a causal 
connection between democratic processes and heightened or decreased levels security. In both 
Iraq and El Salvador, other factors contributed to the evolution of security over the course of the 
post-war period, many of which pertained to political inclusion, cultural factors, and distinctive 
peace processes.  
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Democracy and Insecurity: Two Sides of the Same Coin  
I have drawn several general conclusions from examining the post-war security sector 
over time in both El Salvador and Iraq. First, it is essential to acknowledge that no “cookie-
cutter” mold exists with regard to creating “better” security in emergent democracies. In fact, a 
number of elements, often rooted in highly-contextualized factors like historical and cultural 
particularities, have driven states toward more lasting, stable peace and vice versa. For example, 
differences in factors like timing, geographic dispositions, ethnic and religious compositions, 
electoral systems, and threats have made it exceedingly difficult to juxtapose cases and 
distinguish elements that promote stability. Second, oversimplifying any causality between 
democracy and peace has had damaging repercussions. Even the “best case” scenario, El 
Salvador, possessed significant gaps with regard to post-war judicial reform, thereby 
jeopardizing civilian perceptions of state legitimacy and the efficacy of both the law and the 
judiciary. Spikes in unanswered gang violence and organized crime further underscored 
shortcomings in recreating effective security forces. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iraq’s 
security vacuum enabled the proliferation of non-state actors to wreak havoc on the 
compromised infrastructure that remained, thereby subverting bureaucratic reconstruction 
efforts. While both cases differed greatly, both have illuminated the fundamental tension 
between the process of democratization, particularly in underdeveloped states, and security.  
 With that said, my second and third chapters underscored a few important (albeit 
imperfect) lessons we can examine when looking at security sector reconstruction in the post 
bellum era. Again, various circumstantial disparities between El Salvador and Iraq have made it 
difficult to compare cases directly. For example, El Salvador’s military stalemate likely 
possessed psychological effects on insurgent and government forces alike, forcing them to accept 
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the fact that the use of violence would not yield desired political outcomes. In contrast, the 
insurgency in Iraq rose from the instability created by the transition from autocracy to 
democracy, and the absence of a comprehensive peace process facilitated disorganized chaos in 
the aftermath.  
Situational considerations aside, and with full acknowledgement that extracting lessons 
from two completely different cases could not possibly encapsulate the intricacies of 
reconstructing the security sector, my analysis highlights four key takeaways: (1) in accordance 
with Mansfield and Snyder’s argument, establishing operative institutions, particularly those 
relating to the coercive apparatus, must take precedence over electoral processes; (2) the 
inclusion of former combatants, insurgents, political elites, and members of the armed forces into 
the political process may discourage the use of violence, facilitate the rebuilding process, and 
entrench democratic norms more quickly; (3) multilateral organizations overseeing 
reconstruction efforts may sustain less hostility and resistance than unilateral actors like the 
United States, which has often been perceived as pursuing self-seeking interests; and (4) 
reconstructing the security sector, which includes all aspects of the coercive apparatus, must 
incorporate the establishment of effective penal systems. The following sections provide an in-
depth explanation of each takeaway: 
I. Institutional Strength  
In accordance with arguments laid out by Mansfield and Snyder, institutional strength, 
particularly pertaining to the coercive apparatus, is paramount in providing necessary democratic 
foundations. According to the U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, the first of six 
indicators of legitimacy used to analyze threats to stability and peace is “the ability to provide 
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security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).”389 
Furthermore, the crux of any counterinsurgency effort is “establishing security for the civilian 
populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and 
disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from combat 
operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible.”390  
In cases of successful democracies, most have “had well-developed state institutions, 
particularly administrative bureaucracies that functioned in a reasonably efficient way to advance 
state objectives with minimal corruption.”391 Further, “where...strong democratic institutions 
emerged quickly, democracy was fairly easily consolidated, and the transition was largely 
peaceful…”392 In contrast, the existence of weak institutions often correlates with spikes in 
violence throughout the rebuilding era: “It is often a strategic mistake for an institutionally weak 
state that is handing over power to the mass public to initiate war, and yet such states often do 
exactly this. Why? Such states face a gap between rising demands for broad participation in 
politics and inadequate institutions to manage those popular demands.”393 In his famous work, 
Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington also demonstrated how increased political 
participation leads to conflict and instability in states with weak political institutions. Inadequate 
institutions have three profound effects on the reconstruction era: first, without an effective 
coercive apparatus, members of the populace and political leaders alike become more inclined to 
resort to violence; second, weak institutions enable corrupt leaders to use coercive tactics in their 
quest for power; third, a strong correlation between institutional strength and perceptions of 
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legitimacy seems to exist in emergent democracies, facilitating the rapid consolidation of 
government power.  
 Both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case underscore the importance of institutional 
strength in the rebuilding process; however, it is important to recognize Iraq’s foundational 
deficiencies, many of which can be attributed to Saddam’s top-down hierarchical structure, 
Iraq’s history of political exclusion, and the destruction of infrastructure in the 2003 invasion. 
Therefore, while it’s easy to suggest that institutional strength lays the foundation for more 
peaceful transitions, the process of establishing these institutions is quite difficult, especially in 
states with tumultuous histories. Another facet that strained the construction of institutions in 
Iraq can be attributed to ethno-sectarian divisions: “A democracy with high institutional quality, 
characterized by a high level of civil liberties, can emerge in equilibrium if, and only if, it is 
optimal for all groups,” which connects to the second takeaway.394 
II. Decision-Making: Political Inclusion 
As demonstrated by both the El Salvador and Iraq cases, the inclusion of former 
combatants, insurgents, and political elites in the reconstruction process is crucial for three 
reasons: first, to ensure that those with residual power direct their efforts toward rebuilding 
bureaucratic institutions and stabilizing the political arena, both of which require experience and 
domestic knowledge. Second, elites and former combatants often possess vestigial authority and 
can sway the populace toward aligning with nationalistic interests if the reconstruction process 
does not include them: 
“...Democratization often fosters belligerent nationalism [because] the breakup of 
authoritarian regimes threatens powerful interests, including military bureaucracies and 
economic actors that derive a parochial benefit from war and empire. To salvage their 
position, threatened interests frequently try to recruit mass support, typically by resorting 
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to nationalist appeals that allow them to claim to in the name of the people, but without 
instituting full democratic accountability to the average voter. Exploiting what remains of 
their governmental, economic, media power, these elites may succeed in establishing 
terms of inclusion in politics that force opposition groups to accept nationalism as the 
common currency of public discourse.”395  
 
Third, both El Salvador and Iraq, in different ways, demonstrated the necessity of incorporating 
varied groups in the political arena. For El Salvador, the integration of the FMLN into the 
electoral process not only brought the concerns of marginalized peasants to light, but also 
dissuaded the use of violence in achieving political objectives. In contrast, the exclusion of the 
formerly empowered Sunni Arabs had calamitous ramifications: first, the reconstruction process 
was made much more difficult without the expertise and support of the Sunnis, and second, their 
exclusion encouraged the use of subversive tactics and violence in an effort to sabotage political 
progress. In effect, “the politically (and economically) deprived segments of the population can 
trigger violent conflicts to obtain control over the state apparatus.”396 
III. Multilateral Involvement 
 A fine balance lies between too much external support, which can perpetuate a cycle of 
financial and military dependence or anger domestic elites, and too little external support, which 
can leave emergent democracies fragile and floundering without the necessary assistance. 
However, both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case point to the fact that multilateral 
organizations like the United Nations can have successes less likely to manifest under unilateral 
intervention for several reasons: first, domestic elites can perceive multilateral bodies as more 
legitimate than a single, foreign state. Second, multilateral organizations can possess additional 
financial, administrative and military capabilities, thereby facilitating the democratization 
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process and directing supplementary resources toward maintaining peace. Third, multilateral 
organizations are more likely to press for the implementation of democratic reforms, rather than 
be seen as seeking to influence the outcomes of electoral processes. 
With that said, external support in any form may still disrupt the reconstruction process. 
According to Grimm and Weiffen, “both highly intrusive ‘heavy footprint’ missions (e.g. UN 
interim administrations as in Kosovo and supervision missions by an ad hoc coalition as in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) and less intrusive ‘light footprint’ monitoring missions (e.g. 
Afghanistan) struggle with local resistance against external interference and ‘resilience of the 
local political culture in the face of foreign norms.’”397 Further, “international interference 
suffers from a legitimacy deficit, given that external actors [can] use undemocratic means to 
promote or even impose democratic institutions.”398 In light of these challenges, “there is 
increasing acknowledgement among researchers and practitioners that there are no quick fixes or 
blueprint solutions, that the international community must be more sensitive to the specific 
context in which it is intervening, and that there is a need to gather more profound knowledge 
about the history of targeted countries and to engage domestic actors in the peace- and state-
building process.”399  
In accordance with the statements made above, I argue that the Salvadoran case was 
largely successful because the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 
monitored the implementation of reforms, rather than made decisions regarding the 
reconstruction process. ONUSAL brokered peace talks, logistically contributed to rebuilding 
crucial infrastructure and coordinating elections, and oversaw the disarmament process, but did 
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not involve itself in making crucial political decisions. In contrast, American intervention in the 
Iraq case was met with violent backlash for two primary reasons: first, policy-makers and on-the-
ground troops did not have a clear understanding of Iraqi culture and history, thereby failing to 
consider the importance of including former elites and Sunnis in the political arena. Second, in 
making both political and logistical decisions that furthered self-seeking interests, American 
advisors failed to address the grievances of the Iraqi populace, thereby enabling the proliferation 
of insurgent forces and non-state terrorists.  
IV. Security and Justice  
Despite the primacy of fostering security in post-war settings, it is a necessary but 
insufficient measure to ensure the lasting peace and stability of a transitioning nation. One 
crucial, yet often overlooked piece of the puzzle is the establishment and participation of a 
judiciary committed to providing accountability and justice for wrong-doers. Many peace 
processes focus heavily on the demilitarization of former combatants and the inclusion of 
civilians into police and military forces, often inadvertently neglecting reforms to the judiciary, 
which are crucial in constructing state legitimacy and the state monopoly over the use of force. 
According to one scholar, keeping post-war violence in check depends just as much on the 
coercive apparatus as it does on the judicial branch: 
“Military forces are the ultimate ‘veto players’ in a new democracy. Thus, the task of 
keeping them in the barracks should be paramount in the minds of civilian leaders. Yet 
raising the costs of violent competition requires measures that extend beyond changes in 
the military as an institution. The perpetrators of violence in troubled democracies often 
come from outside the official armed forces. Democratic elites must make every effort to 
neutralize violent groups of all sorts.”400 
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According to Bermeo, two forms of neutralization are essential: first, police forces and the 
judiciary must take “swift action against individuals who engage in political violence—
regardless of ideology or social identity. If police and the judiciary fail to neutralize violent 
actors through jail sentences, they provide compelling rationales for counter violence and further 
lawlessness.”401 Secondly, elected officials must not only distance themselves from the 
purveyors of violence, but they must also condemn the perpetuation of violence by groups that 
align with the politician’s political values; failure to do so “exaggerates the image of the violent 
group’s support, sows panic in the minds of enemy groups, provides another rationale for counter 
violence, and contributes to the likelihood of military intervention.”402 El Salvador serves as a 
particularly salient example; while its reformed military and police forces were successful 
initially, their efficacy abated as Salvadoran penal systems failed to both hold lawbreakers 
accountable and curb corruption. This idea also connects back to the importance of institutional 
strength propounded by Mansfield and Snyder; an effective judicial branch would have likely 
mitigated many of the unintended consequences that jeopardized the success of reforms.  
The rule of law viewed under the lens of judicial enforcement helps the newly democratic 
state make strides in two crucial areas, particularly via the creation of democratic norms: “(1) the 
realization of a clear break with the past, and (2) the development of a constitutional culture 
which teaches state actors that the legal bounds of the system cannot be transgressed for the 
achievement of partisan political gains.”403 The result is two-fold: the application of judicial and 
constitutional review submits both violent actors, who may break the law to commit crime or 
utilize violence as a means, and political actors, who may attempt to exercise arbitrary power 
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over citizens, to the law in an equal manner.404 Subsequently, the accompanying threat of 
punishment via prison sentences or fines curbs the use of violent or subversive tactics, thus 
upholding underlying democratic principles and norms.   
The El Salvador case illuminates the fact that the establishment of an effective judiciary 
is essential to rounding out an operational security sector. The Iraq case, however, demonstrates 
that the coercive apparatus, which includes the military, police forces and intelligence services, 
must be reconstructed first. Iraq’s decrepit security forces, which lacked cohesion and 
coordination, enabled non-state actors like Sunni insurgents and ISIS to monopolize the use of 
force. An effective judiciary would have done little to combat the proliferation of uncurbed 
violence. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 While delving into retrospective lessons from counterinsurgency missions can be useful 
in ensuring we learn from past mistakes, it is equally important to question American 
involvement in these cases in the first place. Although this study focuses heavily on security 
sector reconstruction through a post-war lens, it is crucial to remember jus post bellum remains 
heavily interconnected with jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well. Therefore, in applying the 
lessons from both the El Salvador case and the Iraq case, we should continue to question both the 
rationale in going to war and conduct in war, as both influence the outcome of the post-war 
rebuilding process as well.  
With that said, it remains important to acknowledge that making simple assumptions 
regarding both intervention and democracy promotion in counterinsurgency cases has had 
calamitous ramifications not only for American national security, but also legitimacy abroad. 
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The emergence of non-state actors and unconventional warfare have, in particular, challenged the 
technological and financial advantage that the U.S. has long possessed in war. As the U.S. will 
become embroiled in more 4GW conflicts, adapting to rapidly changing situations both in and 
after war will likely have decisive effects on American victories abroad. More specifically, 
providing effective security for the populace will become an increasingly critical juncture in 
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